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Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?
Jill R. Horwitzt
In recent years, policymakers have increasingly questioned whether
nonprofit institutions, particularly hospitals, merit tax exemption. They argue
that nonprofit hospitals differ little from their for-profit counterparts in the
provision of charity care and, therefore, should either lose their tax-exempt
status or adhere to new, strict, and specific requirements to provide free
services for the poor. In this Article, I present evidence that hospital
ownership-whether it is for-profit, nonprofit, or government owned-has a
significant effect on the mix of medical services it offers. Despite notoriously
weak enforcement mechanisms, nonprofit hospitals act in the public interest by
providing services that are unlikely to be offered by the other types of hospitals.
Imposing onerous charity requirements or limiting nonprofit tax exemptions
may have severe and unintended consequences for all patients, including the
well-insured.
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Introduction
Organizations belong to one of three sectors-the state, the market, or the
independent sector.' Although defining the roles and boundaries of the state
and the market is hard, it is the nonprofit sector that is perhaps the most
difficult to characterize, largely because nonprofits share essential
characteristics with the other types of organizations. Like for-profit
organizations, nonprofits are nongovernmental and, therefore, private; like
government organizations, they must use their assets to further a public
1 The terms nonprofit, independent, third, and nongovernmental, among others, are often used
to characterize private organizations that are neither for-profit nor governmental. Here I use the terms
independent and nonprofit interchangeably, although this paper focuses on a subset of these
organizations, legal charities, which are organizations eligible for federal income tax-exemption under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005).
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purpose. Sharing characteristics of for-profit and governmental organizations,
nonprofits are aptly described as intermediate associations.
In response to these blurred boundaries among ownership types, there
have been recent efforts to reform nonprofit law. Some critics believe that
nonprofits are merely for-profits in disguise and argue that nonprofits should
either lose their legal privileges or be required to adhere to new, strict, and
specific requirements to provide conventional charity. In this Article, I present
evidence refuting those claims. Nonprofits not only have a distinct legal form
and associated benefits but their legal form translates into large, systematic, and
important behaviors that differ a great deal from those exhibited by both for-
profits and government-owned institutions.
Several theories have been advanced to explain how nonprofits function
and why they are needed to satisfy social needs. The problem in evaluating
these theories-and in using them to advance policy-is that they generate few
fully testable propositions. This is because the various theories predict similar
behavior. In such circumstances, when theories do not predict unique behavior,
it is useful to gather information by looking at how institutions behave in
practice. Policymakers can then use this information to predict what will
happen when they pull on a particular policy lever. In addition, empirical
regularities are useful for generating facts that scholarly theories ought to
explain. The more specific and unexpected those facts, the more work they will
do to constrain theorizing. 2 Therefore, rather than developing new theories, this
Article primarily focuses on generating new facts and using them to begin
evaluating existing nonprofit theories.
This Article focuses on the hospital industry, which, in addition to its own
importance, provides fertile ground for understanding nonprofits more
generally. The three types of ownership are more directly comparable in health
care than in other major industries where the three institutional types exist. For
example, there are few for-profit schools; institutions of higher education are
predominantly nonprofit, whereas secondary schools are predominantly
government owned. Moreover, comparing the ownership types of schools often
requires one to compare such dissimilar institutions as grade schools and
colleges. It would be hard to tell, therefore, whether the bundle of legal rules
associated with nonprofit status translates into behavioral differences-such as
providing unique goods, serving different constituencies, or relieving
government burdens.
This is not the case in the hospital industry. For-profit, nonprofit, and
government-owned hospitals have much in common. They use similar
resources, operate under the same substantive health care regulations, employ
professionals trained in the same manner, and are governed by the same
professional and ethical obligations to supply appropriate health care. Their
2 B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in I HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 725 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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mission statements are often indistinguishable. Ownership-and its associated
regulations and benefits-is a major characteristic that differentiates hospital
types. Studying hospitals, therefore, is a way to understand the significance of
nonprofit legal status and related benefits, such as tax exemption.
Given the similar missions of most hospitals, determining whether and
how nonprofits differ from their counterparts, particularly for-profit hospitals,
has presented a persistent puzzle. One would expect that an optimal type of
ownership would have emerged. But it has not. In fact, the distribution of
nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals has remained remarkably
steady.3 Although studies of ownership have produced mixed results, the
preponderance of the evidence points to similarities among firms.4
In this Article, I ask whether hospital types behave differently and why
they might do so. Unlike previous research on hospital ownership, which has
focused primarily on financial measures, I examine whether and how
organizational ownership is correlated with medical service provision. I find
strikingly large differences in service provision by ownership type, with firm
types specializing in medical services according to service profitability. In light
of these differences, I also consider economic theories of why nonprofit
hospitals behave differently from other ownership types, primarily considering
"objectives theories" that maintain that hospital purposes differ by ownership. I
also offer preliminary evidence regarding two alternative theories about what
causes hospital types to behave differently: (1) "capital price theories," which
maintain that differences in capital sources constrain ownership types to behave
differently, and (2) "market theories," which suggest that firms respond to the
ownership form of their competitors in the same market. The results presented
below are more consistent with objectives theories (e.g., suggesting that
nonprofits adopt different goals from their for-profit and government
competitors) than with capital price theories. The preliminary results also
suggest that the ownership of a hospital's neighbors affects its own decisions,
implying that hospital goals may change in response to competition.
This Article is the last of several related papers on ownership in which I
demonstrate the significant correlation between medical service provision and
hospital ownership.5 The main contribution of this article is the full
3 Figure 1, infra at 144. For more detail, see David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, Converting
Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status: Why and What Effects?, in THE CHANGING
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 45 (David M.
Cutler ed., 2000) [hereinafter CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY].
4 For a useful review, see Frank Sloan, Not-for-profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior, in
lB HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). See
also, Gabriel A. Picone et al., Are For-Profit Hospital Conversions Harmful to Patients and to
Medicare?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 507, 507-08 (2002). Cf Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, How
Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine and What to Do About It, HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE
W287 (2006) (reviewing research on nonprofit health care and challenging the conventional view that
nonprofits are similar to for-profits as wrong or incomplete).
5 In a previous article, I summarized a subset of the results presented below, primarily for
policy-makers and health services researchers. Jill R. Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care:
Vol. 24:1, 2007
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presentation of the empirical work on which the overall project was based.6
Here I argue that nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals respond
differently and systematically to economic incentives to supply medical
services. This Article also presents new, albeit preliminary, evidence evaluating
the two additional economic theories regarding hospital ownership summarized
above. The analyses regarding the market theories are particularly important
because without knowing whether there are spillover effects, one cannot
adequately estimate the significance of ownership. 7 Unfortunately, we know
little about these effects. 8 Finally, this Article describes the ongoing political
controversy regarding whether nonprofit hospitals merit their federal and state
tax privileges.
The results presented here can be used not only for policy planning and
regulation but also to consider various theories about organizational behavior.
The results provide both general lessons for law and policy, including
recommendations as to how corporate ownership can be used as a policy tool,
and more immediate implications for the contemporary policy debate. They
highlight how current proposals to reform the nonprofit legal regime,
particularly as applied to nonprofit hospitals, are misguided. In responding to
several high-profile scandals, the desire to address the needs of an increasingly
uninsured population, and pressing budgetary concerns at every level of
government, policymakers have relied on legal and economic research that
questions the significance of nonprofit health care. In fact, many have proposed
revoking the tax benefits of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence presented here
suggests that removing the subsidies associated with nonprofit hospital tax
exemption would come with costs that others have previously ignored.
Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit and Government Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 790 (2005). Further,
in an article intended primarily for legal scholars, I relied on preliminary results regarding one of the
questions analyzed here to consider two plausible accounts of nonprofit hospital service provision, a
legal explanation and an original normative account. Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent
Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1345 (2003)
[hereinafter Why We Need]. In a perspective piece reviewing a survey article regarding ownership in
medicine, I drew from some of the arguments here. Jill R. Horwitz, Nonprojit Ownership, Private
Property, and Public Accountability, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE W308 (2006). An earlier
version of much of the empirical work in this paper can be found in the working paper, Jill R. Horwitz,
Does Corporate Ownership Matter? Service Provision in the Hospital Industry (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11,376, 2005). Here, in addition to considering economic theories of
nonprofit hospital behavior (the capital prices theory and the market theory) not published elsewhere, I
present detailed documentation of the empirical claims. I also use the work to participate in a current
legal and policy debate regarding nonprofit regulation.
6 Although I have written this article to be accessible to policymakers and a general legal
audience, I also intend the detail presented here to be sufficient for social scientists to understand and
evaluate the work.
7 Think of what might happen, for example, if there were no nonprofits. One result might be
that the services that nonprofits provide would no longer exist. The other possibility is that their
competitors-for-profits and government hospitals might change their behavior. For-profits, for
example, might become more (or less) profit-seeking.
8 Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 4. 1 am working with Austin Nichols to more thoroughly
address this subject. Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Peer Pressure: Hospital Ownership Mix and
Service Provision (2006) (manuscript on file with author).
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The Article is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of the
nonprofit sector, summarizes applicable charities law, and describes research
challenges to the sector. Part II outlines the contending nonprofit and hospital
industry ownership models. Part III discusses the research purposes, the data,
and the empirical strategy. Part IV presents the results, and Part V offers
alternative explanations for them. Part VI concludes with theoretical insights
and legal prescriptions that stem from the findings.
I. The Nonprofit Sector: Overview and Reform Efforts
A. Overview of the Sector
Not only is it very difficult to define the nonprofit sector, but it is hard for
scholars to agree on a common terminology for it. Nonprofits are alternately
known as independent, voluntary, or tax-exempt organizations; some theorists
place them in the civil society sector and others in the third or philanthropic
sector.
Given the variation in nomenclature, scholars have turned to functional
definitions of nonprofits. For example, some define these organizations by their
altruism, level of support through donations, or the products they supply.
9
Others define them based upon legal constraints, as organizations that are
barred from distributing profits or net earnings to individuals who control
them.'0 However, although federal tax law prevents tax-exempt organizations
from distributing profits in this way, some state statutes appear to allow such
distributions.11 To add to the confusion, some nonprofits are quite successful at
earning profits. Others are in close partnership with government organizations
and for-profit businesses. 12
Here I use the legal form by which organizations own property as the
identifying feature of nonprofits. Such organizations are generally known as
charities, are incorporated under state law as charitable corporations or
charitable trusts, and are largely eligible for state and federal income and
property tax exemptions.
9 PETER DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1 (1992).
10 Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
11 A Colorado state statute allowed dissolving nonprofits to transfer some assets to other
organizations, including for-profits. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-26-103(e) (1996). This statute was repealed
in 1997 and replaced with new requirements that the assets be distributed for exempt purposes or to the
federal, state, or local government. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-134-105(2). A similar West Virginia statute
was repealed in 2002, although the replacement statute appears to allow dissolving nonprofits to
distribute some assets, e.g., those not received and held by nonprofit corporations subject to charitable
use limitations or restricted in other ways specified by the statute, to for-profit corporations. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3 1-1-155 (2001) (replaced by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31 E- 13-1309 (2002)).
12 See Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and
Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (exploring
opportunities and risks of public and private partnerships).
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The nonprofit sector is large and diverse. Over 1.5 million nonprofit
entities are eligible for federal income tax exemption1 3 and although data
regarding the scope and size of the sector are unreliable (in part because so
many activities are unincorporated), a conservative estimate suggests that in
2004 there were over 2.2 million nonprofits, an almost 30% increase since
1996. 14 Nonprofit employment accounts for at least 9% of the U.S.
workforce.' 5  These entities cover a vast terrain-museums, schools,
cooperative department stores, country clubs, international relief organizations,
churches, zoos, and homeless shelters are all part of the nonprofit sector. This
diversity has made the sector stubbornly resistant to classification and its
benefits hard to justify.16
The most recent IRS data, representing public charities which made tax
filings within 24 months before January 2006, show that public charities
reported total revenues of $1.086 trillion and total assets of $1.934 trillion.17
Most nonprofits, however, are small. Only 1.7% of public charities have annual
budgets over $10 million, whereas 77.9% operate on total revenues of less than
$100,000 annually.' 8 Health care generally, and hospitals in particular,
constitute a large percentage of the sector. Although health care organizations
account for slightly more than 13% of charitable organizations,' 9 because of
13 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector] (statement of David M. Walker,
Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
14 National Center for Charitable Statistics, Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United
States 1996-2004, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profilel.php?state=US (last visited May 19,
2006). This number includes 1,397,263 § 501(c)(3) public charities and 822,817 § 501(c)(3) private
foundations.
15 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 13, at 7.
16 See Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at
Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations-The American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 751 (1989); Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 47 (2005) (statement of George Yin, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation):
There is no agreed upon explanation of the rationale behind the charitable tax exemption and
tax deduction. Some of the basic rationales that have been offered ... may be summarized as
follows: (1) charitable organizations serve the public and therefore should be supported
through provision of tax benefits; (2) charitable organizations provide goods and services that
otherwise would have to be provided by the Government and therefore should be supported by
the Government; (3) it is difficult to measure the net income of charitable organizations, and
therefore they should be exempt from tax; (4) charitable organizations promote pluralism; (5)
charitable organizations are efficient providers of services but have inherent limits on their
ability to raise capital compared to for-profit entities and therefore need government support in
the form of tax exemption (and charitable contributions); and (6) exemption is afforded to
those organizations that can prove their worth through sustained donations.
17 These numbers include only I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) public charities and exclude other large
nonprofits such as private foundations. The data are from the Internal Revenue Service, Exempt
Organizations Business Master File (501(c)(3) Public Charities, 2006, May) and represent public
charities which made tax filings within the 24 months before January 2006. Urban Institute, National
Center for Charitable Statistics, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
18 Id.
19 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, 11 (2005).
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their generally large size, they play a greater role in the sector than this
percentage suggests. Of the revenues and assets reported above, nonprofit
hospitals accounted for revenues of $451.3 billion (41.6% of total public
charity revenues) and assets of $551.6 billion (28.5% of total public charity
assets). 20 Further, health service organizations accounted for about 42% of all
paid independent sector employment in 2001.21
During the study period, almost two-thirds of all hospitals have been
nonprofit, with for-profit and government hospitals making up roughly equal
shares of the remainder (Figure 1). Although the total number of hospitals has
decreased and some have converted from one ownership type to the other
during this period, the net distribution of hospital types has not changed.
Figure 1: U.S. General Surgical and Medical Hospital Beds by
Ownership Type
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
. 1,000 
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•__ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ ........ FP
o 800
600
400
200
0
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Source: Author's analysis of data from the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys 1988-2000.
Notes: FP = For-profit; NP = Nonprofit, Gov = Government. Includes all urban hospitals.
20 Urban Institute, supra note 17.
21 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, NONPROFIT ALMANAC FACTS AND FINDINGS (2002),
http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/npemployment.pdf.
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B. Nonprofit Law
A loose collection of permissive and poorly enforced laws from various
doctrinal areas and all levels of government regulate nonprofits. 22 One must
look, for example, to the common law of trusts and property, tax law, and state
business and nonprofit codes for governing rules.23 Although the common law
governing nonprofits dates back many centuries, the American Law Institute
only recently began drafting the Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
24Organizations.
It is usually quite easy to establish nonprofit status. Founders simply file a
certificate of incorporation, declaring the nonprofit purpose, with the state.2 5
Although approved charitable purposes vary by state, state statutes typically
include vague language about charitable or lawful purposes; many track the
language in the Internal Revenue Code. To receive the benefits that come with
nonprofit status-the most important of which are exemption from taxes
(income, property, and sales), deductibility of contributions from income taxes,
and the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds-nonprofits must adhere to more
stringent requirements than those for establishing nonprofit corporate status.
Yet, those unfamiliar with charities law still find its requirements surprisingly
lenient.
Federal tax law grants income tax exemptions to entities that are
organized and operated exclusively for a charitable or other exempt purpose:
Corporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific,. . . or educational purposes. . . no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation ... . and which does not participate in, or intervene in...
any political campaign .... 26
Nothing in the federal tax provisions governing nonprofits, or arguably in the
common law of charities, requires the nonprofits to provide poverty relief to
qualify for the benefits that come with nonprofit status.
22 1 review these laws in some detail in Why We Need, supra note 5. An excellent,
comprehensive, review of state and federal nonprofit law can be found in MARION FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004).
23 In this section I focus on federal tax exemption law, even though it is likely not the most
important benefit that comes with nonprofit status, because it has been the center of debate regarding
nonprofit hospital behavior. For more detail on the laws governing nonprofits, including state fiduciary
duties, see Why We Need, supra note 5.
24 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
COUNCIL DRAFT (2003).
25 Charities typically adopt the corporate form, although U.S. law allows them to organize as
trusts instead. Forming a trust typically only requires a settlor to establish an agreement with a trustee to
manage property. For a complete analysis of the similarities and differences between charitable trusts
and corporations, see Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do With It? 80
CI-II-KENT L. REV. 641 (2004).
26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005).
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C. Nonprofit Hospital Law
Except for the regulations that guide all hospitals, there is scant law
governing nonprofit hospitals specifically. Again, what exists is shockingly
permissive to those who are new to nonprofit law. Although the Internal
Revenue Code does not refer to health care explicitly, both incorporation laws
and tax rules have long treated the promotion of health itself as a charitable
purpose that meets their requirements. Although we may be now seeing a trend
toward requiring nonprofit hospitals to provide free care as a condition for state
tax benefits, state income tax exemption requirements have often tracked the
federal code in interpreting the term "charity" in the legal sense.27
The legal definition of charity originates in the common law.28 Although
under trust law the promotion of health itself has long been considered a
charitable purpose, 29 determining whether health care would have been judged
a charitable activity when common law was developing 400 years ago is
somewhat perilous. This is particularly true because modem health care has
little in common with medical practice in the 16th century. At least before the
Reformation, the Chancellor counted only pious causes as appropriate
charitable causes.
30
However, later developments suggest that health care could be included
under the traditional definition of charity. In 1601, Parliament passed the
Charitable Uses Act (also known as the Statute of Elizabeth), which listed
charities subject to the jurisdiction of the charity commissions. 31 However, the
act did not establish the full limits of permitted charitable purposes, both
because it "was never regarded as exclusive, but as typical of the kind of
charity which the State wished to encourage," 32 and because some religious
purposes and trusts with general purposes could be enforced by information
(i.e., by a civil suit begun by the Crown or by those under its protection, such as
a charity)33 even if they could not be enforced by the charity commissions
under the act.34 Even though it was merely illustrative, the list of charitable
purposes in the preamble is often cited to identify acceptable charitable
purposes under contemporary American law.
27 John D. Colombo, Hospital Property Tax Exemption in Illinois: Exploring the Policy Gaps,
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 493 (2006). State income tax exemption requirements generally track federal
standards. Property and sales tax exemption requirements, however, vary and many states require
hospitals to provide charitable care in exchange for these exemptions.
28 For a discussion of the Statute of Elizabeth, the Statute of Charitable Uses, and American
cases relying on those statutes, see Why We Need, supra note 5.
29 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Trusts, §§ 368, 372 cmt. b (1959); IV AUSTIN WAKEMAN
Sco'r, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 368, 372 (3d ed. 1967).
30 GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 57 (1969).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 26-27.
33 See BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999) (defining enforcement by
"information").
34 JONES, supra note 30, at 57.
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The preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses permitted gifts for "relief
of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick and maimed
soldiers and mariners . . ." among others.35 Presumably, neither all impotent
people nor sick soldiers and mariners were poor. Further the list includes
several public works such as "repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, seabanks, and highways ... ,,36 These public works, like hospitals,
were available for the use of all residents, rich or poor. Gareth Jones, however,
points to Francis Moore's Reading on the charitable use statutes to conclude
that trusts "whose sole object was to benefit" the rich would be rejected under
the statute, although those who incidentally benefited them would be
acceptable.
37
It is plausible that the provision of health care was conceived of as a
charitable purpose earlier than the 16th century. Scholars often cite William
Langland's late 14th-century poem, The Vision of Piers Plowman, as reflecting
appropriate charitable purposes later listed in the Statute of Charitable Uses.
38
In the poem, the character Truth advises merchants to expiate their sins by
donating their fortunes to good works such as, for example, to "amende
mesondieux thermyd and myseise folk helpe." 39 Scholars rely on Henry Allen
Moe's translation and interpretation to understand the advice in this line of the
poem to mean "And therewith repair hospitals, help sick people"4 ° Moe's
translation of the term "mysese" as sick might be misleading because, as the
Middle English Dictionary explains, "mysese" refers to a characteristic
somewhat more general than sick, perhaps wretched or miserable. Being sick,
however, is arguably an example of the more general "miserable."
Further, some scholars assume that medieval hospitals were more akin to
almshouses than to modem hospitals and, therefore that the poem defines
charity as the relief of poverty and excludes health care. 4 1 This assumption is
35 Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
36 JONES, supra note 30, at 26.
37 Id. at 30.
38 See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 29.
39 WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN, Passus 7, B-Text,
http://www.hti.umich.edu/c/cme/. The quotation can be understood as a suggestion that salvation can be
found through, among other activities, repairing hospitals (especially homes for lepers or the poor) and
aiding the wretched. I thank Bruce Frier and Bill Miller for pointing me to the Middle English
Dictionary and helping me interpret the poem.
40 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at n. 41 (citing W.K. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN
ENGLAND 1480-1660, at 112 (1959)). For Moe's translation, see Henry Allen Moe, "The Vision of Piers
the Plowman" and the Law of Foundations, 102 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'y 371 (1958).
41 Scholars make similar claims about the tax-exemption itself. Bloche, for example, argues
that "[t]he law of trusts, from which the charitable exemption was derived, treated 'promotion of health'
by these hospitals as a 'charitable purpose' because it was a type of relief for the poor." Gregg M.
Bloche, Tax Preferences for Nonprofits: From Per Se Exemption to Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH
AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE W304 (2006). Bloche makes this claim because wealthy people received care
at home, not in hospitals. From this evidence he concludes that nonprofit hospitals received exemption
from the first income tax in 1894 because legislators understood hospitals as providers of care for the
destitute. This does not follow. As explained in the text, trust law has arguably considered health care
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debatable on several grounds. Applying a contemporary understanding of the
term "almshouse" as a free home for the poor is misleading. This is because
"[m]ediaeval [sic] hospitals performed a variety of functions, some having been
founded for the care of the sick and infirm, others for the aged, for the insane,
the lepers, the orphans, and still others for the care of the hopelessly poor and
impotent. 42 These institutions did not have a history of handing out free care
for the needy in any manner that accords with what politicians are demanding
of nonprofit hospitals today. Referring to the hundreds of these homes founded
before 1350-that is half of all medieval foundations-Jordan detailed the
decay that had set in around the time of Langland's poem and long before the
Statute of Uses. For example:
Trustees frequently regarded these hospitals as private hostels; room and lodging
covenants were frequently given or sold; and many of those under monastic
control simply had their revenues expropriated. The fabric of these institutions
was frequently permitted to fall into ruin, and, most serious of all, there were
diversions of trust income to ecclesiastical or private uses on a very wide and
wholly shocking scale.
43
Much later, during the 19th and even into the 20th century, hospital care
was not free in the sense that indigent patients were admitted without
obligation. There were paying patients, albeit a small percentage of patients
overall, and these patients often brought servants with them to feed them and
minister to their other needs.4 But those poor patients whom hospital directors
deemed worthy enough for admission to free beds45 earned their keep. In
exchange for care, patients performed onerous duties, including nursing other
patients, sewing, cooking, providing janitorial services, and offering their
bodies to medical students who needed sick patients on whom to practice their
skills.46 Although in a sense patients' work was part of the treatment since it
was meant to aid in the patients' moral reformation, it was also a form of
payment.47 In fact during the 1890s, when the length of inpatients' typical
hospital stays declined and they were no longer able to work in exchange for
services, the proportion of paying patients at hospitals increased and what had
been merely "token payments took on a real significance. 48
itself as a charitable activity. And simply because hospitals were more akin to almshouse than modem-
day hospitals does not mean that legislators did not consider health care a suitable charitable purpose.
42 JORDAN, supra note 40, at 257-58.
43 Id. at 258.
44 CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL
SYSTEM 39 (1987).
45 See MORRIS VOGEL, THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN HOSPITAL: BOSTON, 1870-1930, at
36 (1980) (discussing admissions restrictions at local hospitals in the mid 19th century, including
restrictions at public hospitals such as Boston City Hospital).
46 See ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 39, 300.
47 DAVID ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE ENTERPRISE: HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE IN
BROOKLYN AND NEW YORK 57 (1982).
48 Id. at 58.
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Therefore, although it is true that the "mesondieux" referred to in the
poem are not reasonably understood as anything like contemporary hospitals,
the reference to helping the sick may be a separate command to do just what
contemporary hospitals do-that is to provide care for pay, albeit with
somewhat more success today than in the 14th century. Finally, hospitals in the
15th and 16th centuries were founded, owned, and managed by monasteries.49
Today they would be designated as charities either as hospitals or as religious
institutions.
Modem guidance on how nonprofit hospitals can qualify for federal tax
exemption comes from a series of federal revenue rulings, which have
periodically imposed and removed additional requirements. 50 A 1956 revenue
ruling interpreted the term "charity" in section 501(c)(3) in its traditional sense,
as "an implied public trust constituted for some public benefit," but it also
required a nonprofit hospital to be "operated to the extent of its financial ability
for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those
who are able and expected to pay."51 This standard was replaced by a 1969
revenue ruling in which the IRS reiterated that "[i]n the general law of charity,
the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable service," and that a
nonprofit whose purpose and activity promoted health would qualify for tax
52
exemption, as long as it met the other tax exemption requirements. The
promotion of health mandate did not require the hospital to provide services to
all members of the community, with the exception of operating an emergency
room open to everyone. A group of indigent patients and organizations
dedicated to expanding health care access for the poor brought suit against the
Treasury Secretary, arguing that the revenue ruling violated the Internal
Revenue Code and had been issued in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, but lost because they lacked standing. 53 The IRS further
narrowed the requirement to provide free care in 1983 when it issued another
revenue ruling exempting hospitals from the emergency room requirement if
they operated in areas with sufficient alternative emergency room access. 54 As
49 JORDAN, supra note 40, at 258.
50 For a detailed review of applicable revenue rulings, see Douglas M. Mancino, The Impact
of Federal Tax Exemption Standards on Health Care Policy and Delivery, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 5
(2005).
51 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203. There is some evidence that charity care may
have been required since 1954. See Mancino, supra note 50, at 10 n.16 (citing Treas. Reg. § 39.101(6)-l
(1954) ("Corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purpose comprise, in general,
organizations for the relief of the poor. The fact that a corporation established for the relief of indigent
persons may receive voluntary contributions from the persons intended to be relieved will not
necessarily deprive it of exemption.")). However, 1959 regulations made clear that the term "charitable"
in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) should be used in its conventional legal sense. See id.
52 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118.
53 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
54 Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. Non-binding, 1992 IRS audit guidelines for hospitals
advised tax-exempt hospitals to have open medical staffs, a full-time emergency room for all those in
need, nonemergency care for those who can pay, and governing boards that include prominent civic
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discussed below, however, some recent cases suggest that charity care may
again become a component of the federal public benefit requirement.
55
D. Reform
Members of both Congressional houses have recently called for nonprofit
sector reform, including changes to charitable giving and nonprofit tax
reporting requirements. 56 Although some reforms, such as permitting tax-free
contributions from an Individual Retirement Account to charitable
organizations, aim to increase charitable giving, others are meant to tighten the
oversight of nonprofit organizations. These latter efforts stem from several
high-profile scandals involving the nonprofit sector, such as the Red Cross' use
of 9/11 donations for other relief efforts, overstated deductions by taxpayers
making in-kind contributions like used car donations, nonprofit hospital debt
collection practices, and concerns about the sector's lack of transparency. 57 In
fact, survey data demonstrate that public confidence in charities has declined
substantially post-9/11,58 likely because of widespread negative publicity about
nonprofits.5 9 In addition, in the face of increasing revenue needs, government
regulators see the nonprofit sector as a new source of revenue. For example, the
staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation proposed several
regulatory reforms (e.g., more stringent limits on tax-deductibility of in-kind
donations) to increase tax payments. 60
leaders rather than primarily hospital administrators and doctors. I.R.S. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22
I.R.B. 59.
55 Mancino, supra note 50, at 5-27.
56 Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent
Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (2005). A summary of all state
reform efforts is well beyond the scope of this introduction, so I summarize federal issues here. The
scope of these reforms is currently under debate. The Independent Sector website has been tracking
bills. See http://www.independentsector.org/programs/gr/charityreform.htm. In addition, several
organizations track state community benefit laws, a large number of which require nonprofit hospitals to
provide free care. These include the Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care, Community Catalyst, and the
Access Project.
57 See Dana Brakman Reiser & Evelyn Brody, Introduction to Symposium: Who Guards the
Guardians?: Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity Governance, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (discussing
the link between media accounts of scandals and nonprofit reform and enforcement activity);
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 19; see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital
Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 535
(2006) (summarizing news stories of, and the policy response to, hospital billing practices).
58 Brookings Institution, Confidence in Charitable Organizations Reaches Lowest Level Since
9/l1, Sept. 9, 2002, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/20020909charitable.htm.
59 Deborah Sontag, Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down? The Red Cross: A Disaster Story
Without Any Heroes, N.Y. TIMES MAG, Dec. 23, 2001, at 32. See generally Marion Fremont-Smith &
Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25
(2003); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Pillaging of Charitable Assets: Embezzlement and Fraud, 46
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 333 (2004).
60 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print 2005).
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Several state and federal legislators have targeted the hospital industry in
particular for reform. This attention to hospitals is not surprising given their
size and wealth and the importance of what they do. Legislators have based
their reform proposals on assertions that there are few, if any, differences
between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Reflecting a long-term focus of
nonprofit hospital scholarship, policymakers have concentrated on the failure to
provide free care for indigent patients as the most important marker that a
nonprofit hospital may not deserve tax-exempt status.6' In fact, many states
have implemented charity care requirements or revoked tax exemption
entirely. 62 Other state policymakers have threatened to impose spending
requirements, such as Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan who proposed
that nonprofit hospitals be required to spend 8% of operating costs on charity
care as a requirement of tax exemption. 63 Scholars continue to argue that
federal law should specify minimum of charity care levels or other types of
specific conditions, such as following quality protocols or public health
benefits, in exchange for tax benefits. 64 Even an editorial in the nonprofit
industry newspaper, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, identified low levels of
charity spending as a "refusal of charity hospitals to serve the public good.' 65
Evidence of the momentum for nonprofit regulatory reform, including
reform of the rules governing nonprofit hospitals, can be found in many places.
During the 109th Congress, the House Committee on Ways and Means held
only twenty-six hearings before the full committee; in addition to a session on
President Bush's trade agenda and another about the future of social security,
two concerned nonprofit hospitals.
66
61 See, e.g., Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit
Hospitals: Hearing Before the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2006). For review see Why We Need,
supra note 5.
62 David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Subsidizing Health Care Providers Through The Tax
Code: Status or Conduct?, HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE W312 (2006) (providing a list of
communities that have challenged hospital tax exemptions.).
63 Robert Pear, Nonprofit Hospitals Face Scrutiny Over Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2006, at A 18.
64 Among more recent discussions are Gabriel 0. Aitsebaomo, The Nonprofit Hospital: A
Call for New National Guidance Requiring Minimum Annual Charity Care to Qualify for Federal Tax
Exemption, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75 (2004); Nancy Kane, Tax-Exempt Hospital Responsibility for the
Financial Burden of the Underinsured and Uninsured 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2007);
Bloche, supra note 41. For a survey of legal scholarship regarding tax-exemption for nonprofit hospitals
see Why We Need, supra note 5.
65 Trent Stamp, A Victory for Charities Is a Loss for Donors, 18 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
June 15, 2006, at 45.
66 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 13; The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter The Tax-Exempt
Hospital Sector].
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Chairman Thomas opened one of the hearings with an expression of
worry that many goods and services provided by the tax-exempt sector are
similar, and even identical, to those provided by for-profit corporations:
Many charitable organizations provide critical social services to those in need.
These organizations benefit greatly from their legal status because they do not
pay taxes and because donors can deduct contributions they make to charitable
organizations. However, many goods and services provided by tax-exempt
organizations are similar, if not identical, to goods and services provided by
tax-paying entities. This raises a fairly fundamental question of what makes
these organizations unique and, hence, deserving of a tax-exempt status.
67
This sentiment was echoed in the statements of those who testified. GAO
Comptroller David Walker asked: "What are the differences between nonprofit
and for-profit entities that perform similar missions, such as nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals, and do the nonprofit entities provide sufficiently different
services to justify their exemption? ''68 Similarly, the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service said: "What we have seen since 1969 [when the
standard for nonprofit hospital tax exemption shifted to a broad community
benefit standard] has been a convergence of practices between the for-profit
and nonprofit hospital sectors, rendering it increasingly difficult to differentiate
for-profit from not-for-profit health care providers." 69 George Yin, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, spoke more pointedly about how nonprofit
hospitals have changed from institutions "supported by philanthropy, staffed by
doctors who worked without compensation, and served, almost exclusively, the
sick poor."
70
There is also some recent, albeit mixed, evidence that the IRS may be
inclined to interpret the community benefit standard for hospitals seeking tax
exemption more stringently than it has in the past. A 2001 Field Service
Advisory concluded that a hospital's policy to provide care for indigent patients
was not sufficient to meet the community benefit test without evidence that the
policy yielded significant services. 71 However, there is evidence that the IRS
did not intend to embrace this advisory as new policy. 72 More recently, in June
2006, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles
Grassley, ordered the IRS to report on how they ensure the compliance of large
nonprofits with federal tax rules and, more specifically, that they provide
adequate free care. 73 Probably in response to this request, the IRS has sent
67 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 13, at 4.
68 Id. at 10.
69 The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 66, at 9.
70 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 13, at 49.
71 T.J. Sullivan, Health Care Tax Law Update (paper presented at American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Nov. 2004), available at https://d2d.ali-
aba.og/index.cfm?fuseAction=displayCoursebookPaper&COMPONENT=4692&NAVM-
ODE=coursebooks&NAVSUMBODE=4681; I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 200,110,030 (Mar. 9,2001).
72 See Mancino, supra note 50 (citing IRS comments); Sullivan, supra note 71 (same).
73 Sen. Grassley Asks IRS to Step Up Oversight of Health Care Nonprofits, 14 HEALTH CARE
POL'Y REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 759 (June 5, 2006).
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compliance check questionnaires to over 550 nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals
and announced that its health care organization audit rates are too low.74 Many
of the questions on this survey focus on the provision of free care. In July 2006,
Grassley also questioned Treasury Secretary nominee Eric Solomon about his
commitment to regulating tax-exempt hospitals, in particular mandating charity
care and community benefit requirements.75
Even the private sector has been involved in questioning whether
nonprofits merit their legal privileges. During the past few years, litigators have
filed approximately seventy class action lawsuits in federal court on behalf of
uninsured patients against hundreds of nonprofit hospitals, hospital systems,
and the American Hospital Association for excessive charges (both for bills
that were too high and for patients eligible for charity care) and aggressive
collection techniques. 76 Although the complaints alleged several causes of
action (e.g. violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and various consumer protection acts), the
suits were based largely on the question of whether the hospitals met their
obligations as tax-exempt institutions.7 7 The exemption arguments were based
on the idea that the uninsured were third-party beneficiaries of implied
contracts between the hospitals and the federal and state government, stemming
from the grants of tax exemption. One case claimed that the defendant, a
charity, entered into an agreement with the U.S. government pursuant to the
federal tax code, and that:
[I]n return for a substantial federal income tax exemption valued in the millions
of dollars it would: operate exclusively for charitable purposes; provide
emergency room medical care to the Plaintiff. . . without regard to their ability
to pay for such medical care; provide mutually affordable medical care to the
Plaintiff and the Class; not pursue medical debt from the Plaintiff ... by
engaging in aggressive, abusive, and humiliating collection lractices; and not
provide financial inurement to private individuals or entities.
Richard Scruggs, the plaintiffs' attorney in most of the charity care cases who
had gained fame from his role in the tobacco lawsuits, put it simply when he
74 Robert Pear, I.R.S. Checking Compliance by Tax-Exempt Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2006, at A15.
75 Grassley Seeks Assurances from Solomon on Charity Hospitals' Tax-Exempt Status, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 136, at GI (July 17, 2006).
76 Court Dismisses Claims of Uninsured, 12 HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP. (BNA) No. 43, at
1495 (Nov. 1, 2004). For an in-depth discussion of the cases, see Leah Snyder Batchis, Note, Can
Lawsuits Help the Uninsured Access Affordable Hospital Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured
Patient Plaintiffs, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 493 (2005). Batchis offers a useful discussion of the claims'
merits although she, like the plaintiffs, uses a more restrictive definition of charity and community
benefits than charities law generally employs and offers an implausible interpretation of standing
doctrine as it applies to potential charitable beneficiaries.
77 Batchis, supra note 76. Some of the claims, such as the state consumer protection claims,
were also brought against for-profit hospitals. The large for-profit hospital chain, Tenet Healthcare,
recently settled 13 cases. Tenet Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overcharging of
Uninsured, 10 HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA) No. 47 (Mar. 17, 2005).
78 Complaint at 18, Harrington v. Baystate Med. Ctr., No. 04-11663RCL (D. Mass. July 17,
2004).
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said, "A non-profit hospital, in order to obtain freedom from taxation, has to
prove that they provide charity care."
79
These federal suits have largely failed.80 However, several state courts
have rejected the defendant hospitals' motions to dismiss. In addition, despite
weaknesses in the plaintiffs' cases, the suits and public attention have affected
hospital behavior outside of the courtrooms. One hospital settled even before
any suit was filed, states have passed laws governing collection practices, and
many hospitals have voluntarily revised and expanded their charity care
policies.
8 1
Nonprofit ownership continues to interest policymakers, activists, and
scholars alike. There is no sign of this interest abating. Despite a near industry
of scholarship on the topic, critical questions remain unanswered.
II. How Do Nonprofit Hospitals Behave? Theories and Evidence
A. The Role of the Nonprofit Sector
Scholars characterize the nonprofit sector according to several, often
overlapping theories. Some theorists describe it as a residual sector, one that
provides goods, particularly public goods, which the other sectors do not or
cannot provide. 82 Nonprofits may, for example, provide a safety valve in
meeting unmet social needs; they fill the service gap perhaps caused by market
or political failures in the other sectors. They may provide higher quality
services than those provided by government agencies. Finally, nonprofits are
both more constrained than for-profits (because they may not use surpluses for
private benefit) and more flexible than government (because they do not need
to be democratic and, therefore, have more ease in meeting heterogeneous
demands). This combination of flexibility and constraint might enable
nonprofits to uniquely answer some social needs.
Other theorists focus not on the provision of particular goods but instead
on the nonprofit sector's ability to solve contract failures. Contract failures can
arise, for example, when consumers are unable to judge product quality,
79 Julia Reynolds & David Montero, Doctored Books, MOTHER JONES, June 17, 2004,
available at http://www.motheijones.com/news/update/20O4/06/06_300.html.
80 James R. King & Travis L. Blais, Nonprofit Hospital Billing Litigation Highlights
Fundamentals of Section 501(c)3, 17 TAX'N EXEMPTS 24 (discussing the litigations generally and the
Mississippi settlement in Gardner v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 2005 WL 1312753 (N.D. Miss. 2005)).
81 Id.
82 See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988). See also Lester M.
Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government Nonprofit Relations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 99 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (inverting the theory to
argue that government, rather than the voluntary sector, is the residual sector). Salamon argues that
public institutions respond to all private market failures, for-profit and not-for-profit alike and that they
provide a more secure basis for provision of public goods than voluntary, private action.
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perhaps because the product is an experience good like health care83 or because
it is provided far away from where the consumer is located: for example,
foreign aid. Nonprofits, because they are prohibited from distributing profits to
shareholders, may be less likely to take advantage of consumers. 84 A variant of
this theory suggests that the nonprofit structure offers individuals, such as
consumers or founders, a greater degree of control over enterprises from which
they purchase goods or donate funds than other ownership forms.
85
Unfortunately, these theories, as well as many other similar ones about
nonprofits, do not offer testable hypotheses. Knowing the distribution of
ownership types does not help, for example, to show why that distribution
exists. It is hard to tell whether nonprofits exist because of historical accident,
path dependence, different organizational goals, consumer demand, or
government regulation. Therefore, rather than trying to answer such broad
questions about the role of the entire sector, scholars have focused on the (only
slightly) less daunting questions regarding whether ownership types behave
differently and why.
B. Do Organizational Types Behave Differently? Theories and Evidence
from the Hospital Sector
The primary theoretical rationale for why different hospital types behave
differently is that they adopt different objectives. Not surprisingly, for-profit
hospitals are assumed to be profit-maximizers, and there is some evidence that,
at least relative to nonprofits, they are more interested in the bottom line. For-
profit hospitals are most likely to respond to economic incentives, 86 avoid
unprofitable patients, 87 and up-code-that is, to inflate patients' diagnosis
codes (e.g., complicated pneumonia rather than simple pneumonia) to generate
higher reimbursements. 88 Indeed, during the 1990s, they had relatively high
profit margins.
89
83 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963).
84 Hansmann, supra note 10.
85 Avner Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Nonprofit Organizations in the Mixed Economy: A
Demand and Supply Analysis, reprinted in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY (Avner
Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui eds., 1993); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit
Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99 (2001).
86 Patricia M. Danzon, Hospital "Profits": The Effects of Reimbursement Policies, 1 J.
HEALTH ECON. 29 (1982).
87 Jason R. Barro, Hospital Conversions to For-Profit Status: Causes and Consequences (Nov.
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
88 Leemore Dafny & David Dranove, Regulatory Exploitation and the Market for Corporate
Control I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,438, 2006); Elaine Silverman &
Jonathan Skinner, Are For-Profit Hospitals Really Different? Medicare Upcoding and Market Structure
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8133, 2000).
89 Richard Frank & David Salkever, Market Forces, Diversification of Activity, and the
Mission of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, in CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at 195.
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At least in comparison to for-profits, government and nonprofit hospitals
prioritize goals other than profit-making. Government-owned hospitals pursue
the goals imposed on them by government agencies. For example, veterans'
hospitals are organized to meet the health care needs of veterans. Government-
owned community hospitals, many of which descended from almshouses, are
required to serve the poor.90 Despite being private entities like for-profits,
nonprofits are more likely than for-profits to adopt goals in the public interest.
For example, they may differentially respond to private91 or public92 market
failures by devoting more resources to serving the needy, or they may
maximize the quality and quantity of medical services at the expense of
profits.
93
The evidence regarding whether hospital types behave differently has
been summarized exhaustively elsewhere. Although the research has led to
evolving and varying conclusions, economists have traditionally concluded that
there are few differences between for-profits and nonprofits. 94 The skepticism
about the uniqueness of nonprofit hospitals has been based on many studies that
have found little difference between the two ownership types in hospital
costs, 95 the exercise of market power,96 the adoption of technology, 97 and
responsiveness to legislation rewarding charity care.98 Differences in charity
care provision and quality have been explained by location rather than legal
ownership.
99
90 Stuart H. Altman & Mary G. Henderson, Introduction, in COMPETITION AND COMPASSION
(Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1989).
91 See Salamon, supra note 82.
92 See WEISBROD, supra note 82.
93 Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a
Hospital, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 64 (1970).
94 See, e.g. Sloan, supra note 4, at 1168. For other summaries, see Yu-Chu Shen et al.,
Hospital Ownership and Financial Performance: A Quantitative Research Review (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11662, 2005); Why We Need, supra note 5. But see Schlesinger &
Gray, supra note 4 (arguing that the skeptics about nonprofit health care have been wrong or their
analyses have been incomplete).
95 Frank A. Sloan et al., Hospital Ownership and Cost and Quality of Care: Is There A
Dime's Worth of Difference?, 20 J. HEALTH ECON 1 (2001); Timothy S. Snail & James C. Robinson,
Organizational Diversification in the American Hospital, 19 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 417 (1998).
96 Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in
Health Care Markets, 13 J. EcON. PERSP. 141 (1999).
97 Sloan et al., supra note 95.
98 Mark G. Duggan, Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1343
(2000).
99 Mark McClellan & Douglas Staiger, Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, in CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at 93; Edward C. Norton &
Douglas D. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the Uninsured, 25 RAND J.
ECON. 171 (1994).
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C. What Causes Nonprofit Hospitals to Behave Differently?
Despite the evidence of similarities cited above, scholars have theorized
about the mechanisms that would cause nonprofits to adopt unique objectives.
First, managerial behavior may differ by type. Nonprofit managers may, for
example, adopt different goals than their for-profit and government
counterparts. There are several possible reasons for this difference in
objectives. Nonprofits may reward their managers according to the degree by
which they meet quantity or quality criteria, rather than profitability, as in a for-
profit firm. 100 Therefore, nonprofit managers will run their hospitals with the
goal of making them relatively big and good. Alternatively nonprofit
organizations may attract managers who are particularly altruistic or who want
to use profits to cross-subsidize unprofitable services, and the nonprofit form
allows them to do so. 0 ' Differences in total monetary compensation among
executives-top-level for-profit hospital executives earn more than their
nonprofit counterparts-may indicate that relatively altruistic managers control
nonprofit firms.'°2 Finally, empirical evidence that different types of physicians
(some of whom staff hospital management committees) work in nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals supports the idea that nonprofits attract particular types of
managers.l03
Alternatively, the nonprofit form may offer non-managers control over
nonprofit goals. For example, the reliance of many nonprofits on private
contributions may force nonprofit managers to follow donor preferences for
non-contractible aspects of quality. 104 Or the form may allow consumers to
control the mission of nonprofit institutions directly. 10 5 A less benign idea
suggests that employees, namely the group of attending physicians on a
hospital staff, have de facto control over nonprofit hospitals. They may use this
control to capture the hospital and operate it in such a way to maximize the net
incomes of physician staff.
10 6
A related idea is that legal rules, rather than managerial differences, cause
nonprofit managers to adopt different goals from their for-profit and
100 Newhouse, supra note 93.
101 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 701, 714-15 (1996); ESTELLE JAMES & SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN THE MARKET ECONOMICS (Jacques Lesourne & Hugo Sonnenschein eds., 1986).
102 Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in
For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 750 (1999).
103 Dennis R. Young, Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations:
Elements of a Theory, in NONPROFIT FIRMS IN A THREE SECTOR ECONOMY (Michelle J. White ed.,
1981).
104 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 85, at 109.
105 JAMES & ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 101; Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, supra note 85;
Avner Ben-Ner, Nonprofit Organizations: Why do they Exist in Market Economies?, in THE ECONOMICS
OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 94 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
106 Mark V. Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as Physicians'
Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 87 (1973).
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government counterparts. A central, some argue essential, feature of nonprofit
law is the non-distribution constraint, which forbids nonprofit organizations
from distributing profits to private owners.'0 7 Alternatively, charitable trust and
corporations' law may encourage, or even force, nonprofit managers to
maximize non-financial ends.' 
08
A second set of theories about why hospital types behave differently has
to do with the price of capital. Because hospital types raise capital from
different sources, they face different capital costs and, therefore, should be
expected to show different patterns of investment in services with high initial
costs. 10 9 The direction of difference, however, is unclear. On the one hand, for-
profit hospitals may face lower costs of capital than nonprofits and, therefore,
may be more likely to offer services with relatively high capital costs. For-
profit hospitals may be able to respond to demand for services more quickly
than nonprofit hospitals because equity financing is more readily available and
less cumbersome to manage than debt financing." 1 They may have more
flexibility in timing expenses than nonprofits because they may reinvest capital
in hospital operations rather than paying interest. In fact, nonprofit hospitals
have explained their decision to convert to for-profit as an attempt to obtain
capital."'
An alternate possibility is that for-profit firms may be more constrained in
investment relative to nonprofits because they face higher costs of capital.
Nonprofit hospitals have several advantages unavailable to for-profits, such as
access to more forms of tax-exempt debt and to tax-exempt, tax deductible
donations.112 Although this is no longer the case, nonprofits historically raised
capital through donations and federal subsidies like the Hill-Burton Act. In
addition, for those nonprofit hospitals with endowments, borrowing tax-exempt
and taxable debt generates a tax arbitrage unavailable to for-profit hospitals.''
3
Therefore, nonprofits should exhibit greater response to demand for capital-
intensive services than other types of hospitals and should have higher levels of
investment in such services.
107 Hansmann, supra note 84.
108 Why We Need, supra note 5.
109 William M. Gentry, Debt, Investment and Endowment Accumulation: The Case of Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 845 (2002).
110 Richard A. Hirth, Consumer Information and Competition Between Nonprofit and For-
Profit Nursing Homes, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 219 (1999).
111 Steven R. Hollis, Strategic and Economic Factors in The Hospital Conversion Process 16
HEALTH AFFAIRS 131, 131-43 (1997).
112 Richard Frank & David Salkever, Nonprofit Organization in the Health Sector, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 129 (1994). Identifying the relative cost of capital is complicated, in part because for-profit
hospitals borrow more than do nonprofit hospitals and, after accounting for tax deductions, taxable debt
can represent a less expensive source of capital than tax-exempt debt.
113 Regulations require nonprofits to use tax-exempt debt proceeds only on physical assets.
Between 1986 and 1997 there was a $150 million limit on outstanding non-hospital, tax-exempt debt.
Gentry, supra note 109, at 849; Gerard J. Wedig et al., Tax-Exempt Debt and the Capital Structure of
Nonprofit Organizations: An Application to Hospitals, 51 J. FIN. 1247 (1996).
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The empirical evidence is mixed. It demonstrates that nonprofit hospitals
had a lower cost of capital than did for-profit hospitals during the 1970s,
although the relationship reversed during the early 1980s.' "4 Regardless of
whether for-profits face higher costs of capital than nonprofits, or vice versa, if
capital prices drive investment decisions, hospitals types should show different
patterns of investment in expensive technology.
A third set of theories explain behavioral differences based on market
effects, focusing on the interaction of hospital type and the ownership status of
neighboring hospitals. The direction of the influence has been debated.
Nonprofits may influence for-profit competitors through some form of standard
setting, such as defining consumer and community expectations regarding the
provision medical services and charity care. Nonprofits and for-profits may
engage in non-price competition, such as competition over quality or their
reputations for making contributions to the community. 1 5 Cutler and
Horwitz,' 16 however, hypothesize that nonprofit and government hospitals learn
from the profit-seeking behavior of new for-profit entrants in a hospital market.
Lakdawalla and Philipson11 7 contend that there should be no influence across
firm types. Although few empirical studies test market effects theories, some
find evidence that for-profit hospitals do influence nonprofits." 
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III. Empirical Strategy
A. Study Questions and Purposes
Economists have generally been skeptical that nonprofit hospital
ownership translates into any significant behavioral differences. In his chapter
summarizing the research on nonprofit hospitals in The Handbook of Health
Economics, for example, Frank Sloan concludes that "the evidence suggests
that for-profit and private not-for-profit hospitals are far more alike than
different."'"19 Although others have recently argued to the contrary, the
perception that there are few differences among types remains strong at least
114 Gerard J. Wedig et al., Hospital Investment Decisions and the Cost of Capital, 62 J. BUS.
517, 525-28 (1989).
115 See Jan P. Clement et al., Charity Care: Do Not-for-Profits Influence For-Profits?, 59
MED. CARE RES. & REv. 59 (2002); Jill A. Marsteller et al., Nonprofit Conversion. Theory, Evidence,
and State Policy Options, 33 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1495 (1998).
116 Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 3.
117 See Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, The Nonprofit Sector and Industry
Performance, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1681 (2005); Tomas Philipson, Asymetric Information and the Not-for-
Profit Sector. Does Its Output Sell at a Premium?, in CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at
325.
118 Duggan, supra note 98; Silverman & Skinner, supra note 88; Cutler & Horwitz, supra
note 3.
119 Sloan, supra note 4, at 1168. For other summaries, see Shen et al., supra note 94; Why We
Need, supra note 5. But see Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 4, at W287.
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partly because previous research has largely focused on financial measures
rather than medical care provision. 1
20
In this Article, I take a step toward filling that research gap by asking this
simple question: Do hospital types differ in their likelihood of offering medical
services? To answer this question, I test the provision of thirty-two medical
services singly. The results, discussed in detail below, show that different
hospital types are not equally likely to offer various medical services. Having
concluded that ownership seems to matter, I then assess alternative
explanations for those differences. I mainly consider whether hospital types
have different objectives. One way to test this is to look at whether the different
types are relatively more or less profit-seeking. I group the medical services by
their relative profitability and then determine whether hospital types vary in
their relative likelihood of offering services according to their profitability (see
Table 1).
I also examine two alternative explanations for why different types of
hospitals might offer different services. It may not be that hospitals adopt
different objectives. Rather, the different hospital types may want to offer the
same set of services but may face different constraints on investing in services,
such as differing capital prices. I test this idea by looking at whether hospital
types are more or less likely to offer services with high start-up costs, which
presumably require more capital than other services. Finally, I investigate
market effects by analyzing whether hospital types behave differently in
markets with relatively high for-profit hospital penetration. Details of the
empirical strategy are given below, and Table 2 illustrates the behavior
consistent with each of the theory types.
B. Data
This study is based on a comprehensive survey of hospital characteristics
and on demographic data regarding the markets in which hospitals operate. The
demographic data are taken from the 1990 U.S. Census. The hospital data, from
the American Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Surveys of Hospitals,
include information from almost every urban, acute-care hospital in the country
(approximately 2,500 hospitals per year) from 1988 through 2000 inclusive.
The hospital sample includes all urban acute-care hospitals that operate in
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with at least two general medical and
surgical hospitals, excluding military, uncategorized federal, and prison
hospitals. 12 The AHA data include variables for services provided, number of
beds, ownership status, teaching status, admissions, and location. Descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 3.
120 Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 4, at W287.
121 Because rural hospitals provide a limited service range, operate under unique federal
reimbursement rules, and include few for-profits (8% in 1995), 1 focus on urban hospitals.
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In the study, I test all relevant acute-care services reported in the AHA
surveys. The AHA surveys ask whether hospitals offer approximately eighty
hospital services. I excluded four types of service questions from the study: (1)
questions that asked about hospital facilities and overall hospital orientation
rather than specific medical service provision (e.g., Do you provide general
medical and surgical care to adults?); (2) questions that duplicated services that
I included through other variables; for example, I excluded the question of level
of obstetric service but constructed two other measures of whether a hospital
had obstetric services (presence of obstetric beds and number of births); (3)
questions outside the scope of a study concerned with acute-care services; for
example, those addressing long-term care, outpatient care, and general non-
reimbursable programs (e.g., Do you run a health fair? Do you provide
transportation to patients?); and (4) questions about insurance arrangements
and corporate medical structure.'
22
The AHA data have several limitations. They are self-reported and not
independently verified, and the survey format changed slightly over the years.
However, there is no a priori reason to suspect that data reliability is correlated
with ownership. The data are also missing values, particularly in the later
years. 123 When hospitals did not report whether they offered a service, I
imputed the values using data from the years before and after the missing year.
For the end years (1988, 2000) I imputed a value based on offerings for the
next or previous two years. Where several years of values were missing, I
excluded the observation from the analysis. Generally fewer than 4% of
observations were imputed for each service.
C. Empirical Methodology
As explained above, I analyzed the provision of 32 medical services
singly to test whether individual service offerings differ by hospital ownership.
But finding that different hospital types are more or less likely to offer one or
122 In addition to the excluded variables listed above, I also excluded four service variables
only because of some deficiency in the measures (i.e., oncology, radiology, rehabilitation, and
hemodialysis). In the case of oncology and radiation, the definitions were too vague to be fruitfully
included in a comparative study. In the case of rehabilitation, a service for which profitability varied
during the study period, the AHA changed the service definition such that the answers were not
comparable over the study period. Further, the AHA survey does not specify the type of rehabilitation
unit in the hospital, does not make clear whether the services are in- or outpatient, and changed the
definition of the service over the study years. In addition, I dropped hemodialysis services despite
preliminary tests that supported my conclusions, because the question did not make clear whether the
services were provided on an inpatient, outpatient, or home basis. Although I would have preferred to
include these services in my study, the data were simply not available, and the validity of a study this
comprehensive is not jeopardized by their absence.
123 Almost 20% of hospitals did not respond to the AHA survey, and the non-respondents
were disproportionately for-profit. Of the study sample, in 1988 approximately 3% of nonprofit, 4% of
government, and almost 18% of for-profit hospitals did not report whether they offered emergency
services. By 2000, those percentages were about 14% for nonprofit, 20% for government, and 26% for
for-profit hospitals.
Yale Journal on Regulation
two services would not provide enough information to understand why those
differences occurred. That requires looking across the provision of many
services. To identify differences and assess alternative explanations for offering
patterns, I performed three additional types of tests. First, I sorted the services
into groups according to their level of profitability. I examined whether hospital
types differed in their likelihood of investing in profitable, unprofitable, and
variably profitable services. If, for example, one type of hospital offers many of
the most profitable services and systematically avoids the services that are
relatively unprofitable, that hospital's behavior is more consistent with profit-
seeking than the behavior of hospitals that provide money-losing services. This
pattern is consistent with theories that different hospital types adopt different
goals. Those medical services .whose profitability varies over time are
particularly useful for considering whether ownership types adopt different
goals because they show how service provision tracks changes in profitability.
Second, I examined whether different hospital types were more or less likely to
offer services with high start-up costs. Finally, I investigated whether hospital
types offered different services in markets with many for-profit hospitals
compared to those with few for-profit hospitals.
1. Medical Service Profitability
Determining whether a service is profitable, a critical step for this
research, is difficult. Profitability is not an inherent attribute of medical
services. It depends on institutional-specific factors, such as management skills,
case mix, and local input costs. Further, even within a single hospital, it is
difficult to determine whether or not a particular service is profitable. Costs and
charges differ, discounts vary by individual payer, and the way hospitals
allocate joint costs among services blurs the profitability picture. Despite these
complications, one can reasonably compare the relative profitability of services
themselves. Although some individual hospitals may profit from providing a
service that I define as unprofitable or others are not able to profit from services
that I define as profitable, it is unlikely that this is systematically the case.
Based on extensive research into a wide range of sources, I sorted the
medical services into three profitability categories: high, low, and variable
profitability. I then re-sorted the services according to the level of required
initial capital investment (Table 1). A detailed research report justifying the
service categories is available elsewhere. 124 Among other sources, I based the
assignments on peer-reviewed research; interviews with hospital
administrators, doctors, and policymakers; and analyses of the socioeconomic
or insurance status of patients likely to demand various services. I also
124 Jill Horwitz, Research Note: Relative Profitability of Acute Care Hospital Services, online
supplement to Jill R. Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit,
and Governmental Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 790 (2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs-
.org/cgi/data/24/3/790/DC 1 / 1.
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analyzed physician salaries by specialty, assuming that higher physician
salaries indicated more profitable services and lower physician salaries
indicated less profitable services.' 25 Because Medicare payments are the largest
single source of hospital revenues, I also examined the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission (ProPAC) reports to Congress for the relevant years. Because this
project is concerned primarily with hospital behavior and motivation, I also
undertook a comprehensive review of trade publications, business magazines,
and newspaper reports. This qualitative evaluation of relative service
profitability-that is, what trade journals reported to hospital executives
regarding service profitability-was critical to the project because perceptions
of whether a service would be profitable were as likely as, and possibly more
likely, to be important determinants of service investment choices than whether
services actually turned out to be profitable. That there was so little
disagreement among sources is reassuring (see Table 4). To give readers a
sense of how I defined profitability, I summarize the evidence for three services
here.
An example of a relatively profitable service is open-heart surgery
(coronary artery bypass graft or CABG), one of two revascularization
procedures used to improve blood supply to the heart after a patient suffers a
heart attack by splicing a piece of vein or artery from another part of the body
around the blocked artery. It is widely perceived that cardiac services-
including cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery-are
hospital profit centers.1 26 There is considerable evidence that cardiac care's
money-making reputation is justified. As surgical services, cardiac treatments
are typically well-reimbursed by insurers. 127 And, because cardiac disease is
associated with age, patients receiving CABG are unusually well insured
because most are covered by Medicare. Further, there has been high and
increasing spending on cardiac care.' 28 From 1984 to 1994, the real price for
125 It may help readers unfamiliar with health care financing to know that physician and
hospital reimbursement typically comes from different sources and that physicians are not typically
hospital employees. Therefore, a high physician salary does not necessarily translate into a high hospital
expense. Understanding the structure of hospital and physician payments, therefore, makes the
assumption that profitable physician specialties are associated with profitable hospital services more
reasonable to the uninitiated. Compiled data regarding physician salaries are available from the author.
Primary data are from the following reports: HOSPITAL & HEALTHCARE COMPENSATION SERVICE,
PHYSICIAN SALARY SURVEY REPORT (1996); MEDICAL GROUP MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND PRODUCTION SURVEY (1996); MEDICAL GROUP MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND PRODUCTION SURVEY (2002); MEDICAL GROUP
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND PRODUCTION SURVEY (2005).
126 Heidi J. Stout, A Healthy Bottom Line, PORTLAND BUS. J., May 11, 2001,
http://portland.bizjoumals.com/portland/stories/2001/05/14/focus l.html; Mary Wagner, Cardiac
Administration Taking Offat Hospitals, 21 MODERN HEALTHCARE 26, 28 (1991).
127 David M. Cutler et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J. ECON. 526 (2000);
Telephone Interview with Troyen Brennan, President, Brigham and Women's Hospital Physician
Organization, in Boston, Mass. (2002).
128 Cutler et al., supra note 127.
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bypass surgery among Medicare patients increased by 2.3% annually from
$29,176 to $36,564 (1991 dollars), while the share of patients receiving the
treatment increased by one percentage point annually from 5 to 15%.l 19 The
costs of supplying CABG in real terms were either flat or fell during the same
period. 130 In 1991, because spending on bypass surgery was so high, the Health
Care Financing Administration ran a pilot program in which hospitals and
physicians negotiated bypass surgery prices. 131 During the study period, for-
profit corporations opened single-service cardiac surgery centers, causing
neighboring hospitals to lose profitable business
132
Conversely, hospital-based psychiatric emergency services are relatively
unprofitable for several reasons. First, the emergency room is generally an
unprofitable setting, which attracts patients whose admissions are relatively
expensive. During the study period, many providers believed that emergency
care was unprofitable, in part because Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
did not include additional payments for emergency care that preceded inpatient
care or overhead costs and therefore did not cover costs such as licensing and
standby costs.1 33 In fact, whether reimbursements are actually sufficient to
cover the costs of emergency care prior to admission depends on total
reimbursement by admission.
Second, psychiatric care reimbursement is uncertain and often low relative
to cost. 134 Psychiatric emergency patients are dominated by two groups of
patients characterized as "bad payers'--the Medicaid population and the
uninsured.135 During the 1990s, both private and public payers sought methods
to control mental health costs. To balance their budgets, state Medicaid
programs facing budget shortfalls often cut mental health services, including
services previously available in state psychiatric hospitals.1 36 The rapid
129 David M. Cutler et al., Pricing Heart Attack Treatments, in MEDICAL CARE OUTPUT AND
PRODUCTIVITY 305 (David M. Cutler & Ernst R. Berndt eds., 2001).
130 David Cutler & Robert S. Huckman, Technological Development and Medical
Productivity: The Diffusion ofAngioplasty in New York State, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 187 (2003).
131 Jerry Cromwell et al., Cost Savings and Physician Responses to Global Bundled
Payments for Medicare Heart Bypass Surgery, 19 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 41, 41 (1997).
132 Harris Meyer, Focused Factories: Are You Ready for the Competition?, 72 HOSPITALS &
HEALTH NETWORKS 24 (1998); Shirley Dang, Ground Broken for Heart Hospital, MILAWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1 D; Mike Gallagher, Bitter Medicine: Presbyterian Plans Painful for
Doctors, ALBUQUERQUE J. Mar. 10, 1998, at Al; Michael Romano, Round 3: Doc Privileges Fight
Heating Up, 34 MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 16, 2004, at 10; Ron Winslow, Coronary Bypass: Fed-Up
Cardiologists Invest in Own Hospital Just for Heart Disease, WALL STREET J., June 22, 1999, at Al;
Kelly J. Devers et al., Specialty Hospitals: Focused Factories or Cream Skimmers?, Issue Brief, Center
for Studying Health System Change, Apr. 2003, at 1.
133 Jeffrey S. Eisenberg, ERs on Critical List, FOCUS, Apr. 18, 1990.
134 See Albert Woodward et al., The Drug Abuse Treatment Gap: Recent Estimates, 18
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 5, 5 (1997).
135 Telephone Interview with Gary Gottlieb, President, Brigham and Women's Hospital, in
Boston, Mass. (Feb. 14, 2002).
136 Medicaid: Louisiana Gov. Edwards Proposes 12 Percent Cut in Program Spending,
HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 31, 1995).
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expansion of mental health carve-out programs and other cost-control methods
also led to low provider payments in private settings.
1 37
Third, mental health services attract a poor, poorly insured, sick, and
difficult-to-manage population. 138 The patients who use psychiatric emergency
care are particularly underprivileged. 139  Young adults, who are
disproportionately uninsured, are overrepresented as mental health patients,
whereas the elderly, who are insured by Medicare, are underrepresented.140
Finally, not offering psychiatric emergency capacity may protect hospitals
from liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), which requires hospitals that both have emergency rooms and
serve Medicare beneficiaries to stabilize emergency patients, including those
with emergency psychiatric conditions, 14' before transferring them to another
hospital.142 If a hospital does not offer psychiatric treatment or have mental
health professionals on staff, EMTALA does not require it to stabilize
emergency psychiatric patients before transferring them, 143 thus making it
easier to transfer a class of poorly insured, high-risk patients.
Post-acute services, such as home health and skilled nursing, 144 are the
most useful services for testing hospital responsiveness and inferring hospital
goals because their profitability varied over the study period in response to
changes in regulations. Changing reimbursement rules offer an exogenous
shock-one that is independent of the type of hospitals choosing to offer
services. With the implementation of the prospective payment system in 1984,
post-acute services became very profitable. In contrast to acute services for
which hospitals received a single per-episode payment for each patient,
Medicare paid a cost-related reimbursement for post-acute services. For
example, home health services were reimbursed according to cost, up to 112%
of the national mean cost per visit.145 In addition, the payment system was
137 See, e.g., Richard G. Frank et al., Some Economics of Mental Health Carve-outs, 53
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 933, 933 (1996); Haiden A. Huskamp, How A Managed Behavioral
Health Care Carve-Out and Benefit Expansion Affected Spending on Treatment Episodes, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1559, 1559 (1998).
138 See James M. Ellison et al., Repeat Visitors in the Psychiatric Emergency Service: A
Critical Review of the Data, 37 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHiATRY 37, 37 (1986); Harvey Schwed,
Teaching Emergency Room Psychiatry, 31 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 558, 561 (1980);
Woodward et al., supra note 134, at 16-17; Larry Tye, Beth Israel to Keep Psychiatric Unit Most Beds
to Stay, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2001, at B2.
139 See Dirk M. Dhossche & Shareh 0. Ghani, A Study on Recidivism in the Psychiatric
Emergency Room, 10 ANNALS CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 59, 64 (1998).
140 See Ellison et al., supra note 138, at 37.
141 Psychiatric disturbances may constitute an emergency condition. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(ii)
(2005).
142 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd
(2006).
143 Baker v. Adventist Health. 260 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2001).
144 1 have eliminated rehabilitation services from the analysis because the AHA survey does
not specify the rehabilitation unit type, which strongly affects service profitability.
145 See Joseph P. Newhouse, Medicare, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990S 899
(Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002).
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particularly generous to entrants, exempting skilled nursing facilities and home
health services from cost limits for the first three to four years of operation.
146
These generous reimbursements, coupled with the fixed payment built
into the Medicare payment system, made post-acute services a particularly
valuable source of revenue for acute-care hospitals. Rather than receiving a
single payment for an inpatient, hospitals could increase reimbursements by
unbundling the services and transferring a patient to a post-acute bed at the end
of the hospital stay. There is considerable evidence that many hospitals indeed
made these transfers. Between 1988 and 1996, acute-care lengths of stay fell
27% for Medicare patients and only 15% for all patients; during the same
period post-acute service usage and payment rose rapidly. 147 Finally, the
hospital could allocate joint costs to post-acute units, increasing the total
reimbursement to the hospital.
Both the rapid increase in Medicare spending and the utilization of post-
acute services reflect hospitals' responses to these incentives. Although the
incentives for providing post-acute services were in place in the early 1980s, it
was not until the late 1980s that eligibility and coverage guidelines were
clarified in federal court decisions.14  The potential profitability of these
services soon came to be widely understood by hospital administrators,
consultants, and regulators alike. 149 One article in the trade press, for example,
urged hospital administrators to view skilled nursing facilities as a "higher
reimbursement category, not necessarily a geographic location." 150 Home
health payments grew from $3.9 billion to over $18.3 billion between 1990 and
1996.151
In the early 1990s, regulators began searching for solutions to contain
post-acute service spending 15 and thus constrain the profit-making
opportunities of post-acute care. With passage of the 1997 Balanced Budget
146 Interview with Joseph P. Newhouse, Professor of Health Policy and Management and
Director of the Division of Health Policy Research and Education, Harvard Univ., in Boston, Mass.
(Apr. 2, 2002).
147 See Newhouse, supra note 145.
148 Duggan v. Bowen, 691 F.Supp. 1487 (D.D.C. 1988), effective 1989, struck down a
Department of Health and Human Services interpretation of a Medicare provision that denied home
health aid services to claimants who required care more than four days a week.
149 See, e.g., Charles Helbing & Elizabeth S. Cornelius, Skilled Nursing Facilitiess, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV., Supp. 1992, at 97; Charles Helbing et al., Home Health Agency Benefits,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Supp. 1992, at 125; Nancy J. Scharmach, Diversifying into Skill-
Nursing Care: It Can Fill Beds, Manage Medicare Costs and Meet a Need, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr.
30, 1990, at 30; Lynn Wagner, Hospitals Seeing Benefits in Offering Long-Term Care, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Mar. 24, 1989, at 40.
150 Peter L. Deangelis, Jr., Hospital Based SNFS an Alternative to Empty Beds, HEALTHCARE
FIN. MGMT., Aug. 1987, at 60.
151 KORBIN LtU ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICARE'S POST-ACUTE BENEFIT:
BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUES TO BE FACED, available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mpacb.htm (last visited June 25, 2002).
152 See, e.g., Bruce C. Vladeck & Nancy A. Miller, The Medicare Home Health Initiative,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1994, at 7.
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Act (BBA) Medicare payments were reduced, the Health Care Financing
Agency developed a prospective payment system for post-acute services, and
spending on home health care fell by a factor of two.
Extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy (ESWL) and magnetic resonance
imagining (MRI) are two services useful in testing capital price theories as both
require high initial investments. In 1984, the Food and Drug Administration
approved the use of extracorporeal shock wave lithotripters, machines that use
shock waves to shatter kidney stones or gallstones. Because typical lithotripters
cost about $1 million, only approximately 240 hospitals in the country had
them in the early 1990s, but in 1991, there were reports that a new, much less
expensive machine was being developed. 153 MRI allows technicians to
determine tissue types by looking at a map of how hydrogen nuclei in different
parts of the body respond to the magnetic field generated by the machine. Like
all diagnostic imaging equipment, MRI technology is very expensive: In 2002,
a typical machine, excluding installation and licensing fees, cost approximately
$1.5 million. 15 4
2. Do Hospital Types Offer Different Services?
I first tested all the medical services separately to determine whether
different hospital types were more or less likely to offer them. To ensure that
the results reflected the influence of ownership and not other hospital or
geographic characteristics, I controlled for several other factors. For example, a
hospital's size is a strong predictor of whether it offers a service. Big hospitals,
not surprisingly, offer more services than small hospitals. Hospitals with
residency programs are also more likely to offer all medical services, so I
controlled for that as well. In addition to the characteristics of the hospital
itself, other factors unrelated to hospital ownership might determine whether a
hospital offers a given service. For example, hospitals might respond to the
needs of the local population. I included several variables-age, race,
education, and wealth-in the regressions to ensure that I was comparing
hospitals with similar populations and thus similar demands for health care.
Finally, hospital types are more prevalent in certain regions. There are more
for-profits, for example, in the South and Southwest. Therefore, I included
several region variables in the regressions to ensure that the results did not
reflect the influence of geographic regions, but rather ownership.
153 Jackhammer Could Crush Cost of Treating Kidney Stones, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 10,
1991, at 19.
154 Telephone interview with GE Medical Systems Sales Representative, in Needham, Mass.
(Apr. 19, 2002).
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I estimated the following model: 155
E(Service Provided)i, = 0[3o + 131 Formit + 132 Yeart + 33 Year,*Formi, + 134 Hi, +
135 D] (1)
Form is an ownership indicator variable; Year is an indicator variable for year;
H are hospital characteristic variables including hospital size (quartiles of
admissions), teaching status (teaching association membership), and a dummy
variable for geographic region; D are demographic variables of the hospital's
vicinity (including percentages of the population by sex, white or African-
American race, in of household income, and eight age categories). These were
compiled from 1990 Census data arranged by aggregating census block groups
that fell within a 10-mile radius of the centroid of the zip code in which the
hospital operated. This distance is commonly used in the literature, and 10.4
miles is the mean distance radius that captures 75% of discharges from acute-
care hospitals in urban settings. 1
56
Because the probability of a hospital offering a service is not independent
from one year to the next, I allowed for an arbitrary covariance matrix within
each hospital over time. I also adjusted the models for heteroskedasticity. By
varying only the corporate form of the hospital while holding the independent
variables constant (at 1994 or next closest year levels), I predicted the
probabilities that each hospital in each year would offer a given service. Then I
averaged the individual predicted probabilities to obtain the probability that a
hospital type would offer a service each year. Using the Probit model, I
assumed that the binary variable follows a binomial distribution.
3. Market Effects
To determine whether the mix of hospital types in a market affects
individual hospital service choices, I added a variable that reflected the
interaction between the ownership of each individual hospital and the
ownership mix of the market in which it operated. Again, to ensure that I was
comparing hospitals that were similar on all relevant observable dimensions
except for ownership, I accounted for the hospital and local demographic
characteristics listed above.
155 One might think about using fixed effects to examine ownership, but doing so makes the
estimation depend only on the experience of hospitals that switch form. The sample of switching
hospitals is small and likely to be biased in ways that are correlated with service offerings. For example,
money-losing hospitals are more likely to change form and also to forgo investment in services, plant,
and equipment.
156 Carol Roan Gresenz et al., Updated Variable-Radius Measures of Hospital Competition,
39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 417, 423 (2004).
Vol. 24:1, 2007
Nonprofit Ownership
I estimated the following model:
E(Service Provided)i, = (1[3o + J31Formit + 2Yeart + t33Yeart*Formit + W34Marketit
+ 35 Formit*Marketit + 36Yeart*Formit*Marketit + P7Hit + 038D it] (2)
The market dummy variable identifies for-profit markets, defined as those
MSAs in which for-profits represent more than a given percentage of
admissions. As in model 1, the observations were clustered according to
hospital identification number, and I assumed that the binary variable follows a
binomial distribution.
IV. Results
This section presents the findings for services that are representative of
the four categories of services discussed above-consistently profitable (open-
heart surgery), consistently unprofitable (psychiatric emergency), variably
profitable (home health), and those with high capital costs (MRI and ESWL).
Table 5 summarizes results for all tested services.' 57 Taken together, the results
show that hospital types specialize in services according to the profitability of
those services.
A. Objectives Theories
If hospital types differ in their provision of medical services because they
are more or less profit-seeking-that is, if profit-maximization occupies a
different priority in hospital objective functions depending on ownership
type-one would expect for-profits to be most likely to offer profitable
services, government hospitals to be least likely, and nonprofits to fall in the
middle. Further one would expect the opposite pattern for unprofitable services
(see Table 2 for model predictions). The evidence supports this hypothesis.
1. Consistently Profitable Service: Open-Heart Surgery
Although I focus on open-heart surgery in this section, the results for
cardiac catheterization labs and angioplasty are remarkably similar. For-profits
are more likely to offer these cardiac services than nonprofits, which in turn are
more likely to offer them than government hospitals. In other words, corporate
ownership plays a role-in fact, a strikingly large role-in the decision to offer
cardiac care. This can be seen best in Figure 2, which plots the Probit predicted
probabilities of service offerings by hospital type, controlling for the hospital
and demographic characteristics discussed above. For-profits are, on average,
13 percentage points more likely than government hospitals (40.9% v. 27.9%, p
157 Further detail available from author.
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< 0.001) and 7.3 percentage points more likely than nonprofit hospitals (40.9%
v. 3 3 .6 %,p < 0.001) to offer open-heart surgery' 58
As noted, the results are statistically significant. Specifically, the null
hypotheses that for-profit, nonprofit, and government provision of open-heart
surgery are jointly equal 159 to each other (the coefficients on the corporate form
and corporate form * year interaction variables for one form are jointly equal to
those of another form) can be rejected at the p = 0.01 level.
In addition, the probability of offering open-heart surgery increased for all
three types of hospitals (Figure 2), possibly indicating diffusion of technology,
learning, or an increased interest in providing profitable services. 60 The pattern
of service provision for open-heart surgery supports the idea that different
hospital types have different goals. This evidence alone, however, does not help
determine whether for-profits offer more services overall or offer only more
profitable services. For that, one must look at more types of services.
Figure 2: Probability of Offering Open Heart Surgery
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Source: Author's analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, nonrural hospitals in MSAs > I
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (NP v. FP: p<0.001; NP v. Gov: p=0.001;
FP v. Gov: p<0.001).
158 Regression results available from author.
159 I conducted two sets of hypothesis tests: 1) tests on whether the coefficients on the
corporate form and corporate form * year interaction variables for one form (e.g. for-profit) are jointly
different those of another form (e.g. nonprofit) and 2) tests on whether the average of these coefficients
are different among forms. These hypothesis tests, which I refer to as the Joint Tests and the Average
Tests, are presented in Table 6.
160 This relationship can again be seen best in the figure, but it is also evident in the positive,
significant, and increasing coefficients on the year dummies, and the mostly small and insignificant
coefficients on theyear * gov andyear *fp interactions, which indicate that the relationship between the
forms remained stable over time. Regression results available from author.
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2. Consistently Unprofitable Service: Psychiatric Emergency Care
In direct contrast to the provision of open-heart surgery, for-profits are
less likely than nonprofits, which in turn are less likely than government
hospitals, to offer the unprofitable service of psychiatric emergency care (see
Figure 3). Therefore, once again, corporate ownership plays a role in service
offerings. On average from 1988 to 2000, 41% of for-profit hospitals were
predicted to offer psychiatric emergency services, compared to 48% of
nonprofit hospitals and 56% of government hospitals.
Again, these are large differences. For-profits are 15 percentage points
less likely than government hospitals to offer psychiatric emergency services.
This can be seen best in Figure 3, which plots the Probit predicted probabilities
of offering psychiatric emergency care by hospital type.
These results are also statistically significant. Specifically, the null
hypotheses that, for all thirteen years, (1) for-profit and government hospitals
and (2) nonprofit and government hospitals were equally likely to offer the
services can be rejected at the .001 level. However, the null hypothesis that the
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are jointly equal cannot be rejected (see Table
6).
Finally, the probability of offering psychiatric emergency services
remained flat over time, and the relationship among types remained
approximately constant' 61 (see Figure 3). The investment patterns for
psychiatric emergency care also lend support to the hypothesis that different
ownership types adopt different goals. Government hospitals appear relatively
more willing to invest in a service that is needed by the public than are
nonprofits, which are, in turn, more willing to provide the service than are for-
profit hospitals. This evidence, coupled with the evidence from open-heart
surgery, supports the view that hospital types differ according to their interest
in pursuing profits rather than according to their interest in pursuing more or
fewer services per se.
161 The relationship can also be seen by the mostly small and insignificant coefficients on the
year dummies and on the year * gov and year *fp interaction terms (regression results available from
author), which indicate that the relationships among hospital types remained stable over time.
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Figure 3: Probability of Offering Psychiatric Emergency Care
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Source: Author's analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > I
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (NP v. FP:p=0.001; NP v. Gov: p<0.001;
FP v. Gov: p<0.001).
3. Service with Variable Profitability: Home Health Care
The home health care results are perhaps the most striking and provide the
most convincing evidence that hospitals' objectives differ. They demonstrate
that for-profit responsiveness to financial incentives is strong and quick-likely
because for-profits are relatively more profit-seeking than the others. More
specifically, the provision of home health care services varied by ownership,
and the relative differences among types varied over time. In addition, the
probabilities of offering home health services when the service was profitable
increased for all three hospital types, but most dramatically for for-profit
hospitals. Figure 4 shows that the growth and decline of home health care
among for-profit hospitals tracked the ability of hospitals to profit from home
health.
From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for-profit hospital offering home
health services more than tripled (17.5% to 60.9%). In contrast, during the
same period, the probability of offering home health care grew only slightly
more than 10 percentage points (40.9% to 51.7%) for nonprofit and 14
percentage points (38.1% to 51.9%) for government hospitals. From 1997 to
2000, as home health care became less profitable with the BBA's
implementation, the probability of offering it fell a striking 37.5 percentage
points among for-profits, 7.7 percentage points among nonprofits, and 1.5
percentage points among government hospitals. All relevant null hypotheses
can be rejected at the 0.01 level (Table 6).
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Figure 4: Probability of Offering Home Health Service
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Source: Author's analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, nonrural hospitals in MSAs > 1
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (NP v. FP: p<0.001; NP v. Gov: p=0.0705;
FP v. Gov: p<0.001).
4. Looking Across all Services
Although for-profit hospitals were only somewhat more likely than
nonprofits to offer profitable services, both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals
were considerably more likely than government hospitals to offer profitable
services; for-profits were less likely than nonprofits, which in turn were less
likely than government hospitals, to offer unprofitable services (Table 5). The
objectives theory is supported most strongly by the provision patterns for
services with variable profits. As can be seen in Table 7, for-profits exhibited
dramatic responsiveness to financial incentives, particularly in terms of
investing in post-acute services as they became profitable and divesting from
them as they became unprofitable.
B. Capital Price Theories: Results
An alternative to the idea that hospital types offer different services
because they have different goals is that they do so because they face different
capital costs. As discussed above, it is unclear which types of firms face higher
or lower costs of capital. However, if differences in capital costs explain the
propensity to offer medical services, the hospital types should exhibit different
probabilities for offering services with high initial costs-that is, those services
that require considerable capital (see Table 2 for model predictions). To
evaluate this alternative explanation for the outcomes, this section discusses
two services that are representative of those requiring high initial expenditures:
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ESWL and MRI. For comprehensive results see Table 5 (services with high
initial capital needs in italics). The data demonstrated neither hypothesized
pattern of the capital constraint theory, namely a pattern of investment in which
either for-profit or nonprofit hospitals consistently invest more in these
services.
Consistent with theories about technology diffusion, all types of hospitals
were more likely to offer ESWL and MRI over time. The patterns of adoption,
however, were quite different (Figure 5). For-profit hospitals were always more
likely to offer ESWL services during the years studied. On average, 22% of
for-profit hospitals, 17% of nonprofit hospitals, and 13% of public hospitals
were likely to offer ESWL. These differences are significant at the 0.003 level
(Table 6).
On the other hand, for-profits were only slightly more likely than
nonprofit hospitals to have MRIs. On average, controlling for hospital and
demographic characteristics, the model predicts that 51% of for-profit hospitals
and 48% of nonprofit hospitals will have MRIs. This difference is insignificant
(see Table 6). Further, the relative probability of offering the service changed
over time. Between 1988 and 1992, nonprofit hospitals were more likely than
for-profit hospitals to have MRIs; between 1993 and 1998, for-profits were
more likely than nonprofits to have them. Government hospitals were, on
average, approximately 7 to 10 percentage points less likely than either of the
other types to offer MRIs (see Figure 6).
Other services examined in the study demonstrated neither pattern
predicted by the capital price theory. For example, for-profits were less likely
than nonprofits to have birthing rooms, a capital-intensive service, during the
early years of the study (in 1988 F=64% v. N=70%), but by 2000 that gap had
shrunk (F=75% v. N=77%). Government hospitals were less likely than the
other types to have CAT scanners, another capital-intensive service, during the
early years of the study (e.g., in 1988 F=88%, G=80%, N=87%), but by 2000
they were more likely to have them (F=93%, G=96%, N=95%). From these
results it appears that access to equity capital did not lead for-profit hospitals to
consistently make greater investments in expensive technology than did
nonprofits. Nor did access to tax-exempt debt, endowment, or tax arbitrage
opportunities lead nonprofit hospitals to consistently make greater investments
in expensive technology than for-profits.
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Figure 5: Probability of Offering ESWL
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Source: Author's analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, nonrural hospitals in MSAs > I
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (NP v. FP: p<0.001; NP v. Gov: p=0.003;
FP v. Gov: p<0.001).
Figure 6: Probability of Offering MRI
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Source: Author's analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000.
Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > I
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (NFP v. FP: p=0.191; NFP v. Gov:
p<0.001; FP v. Gov: p<0.001).
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C. Market Results
The results also help test another hypothesis: Hospitals within the same
market interact and affect each other's behavior. For example, Hansmann has
argued that for-profit hospitals might be expected to provide more
uncompensated care in markets with high nonprofit market penetration because
of charitable norms established by their competitors. 162 However, given the
results presented above, I suggest that one would expect firms in markets with
higher for-profit penetration to offer more profitable services and fewer
unprofitable services. To examine these ideas, I ask: Do hospital types offer
different services depending on the for-profit penetration in the local markets?
(See Table 2 for model predictions).
The basic specification tests the interactions between ownership form and
a dummy variable for for-profit markets, defined as MSAs with greater than or
equal to 20% for-profit admissions; this is a useful breakpoint because few
hospitals operate in markets with higher for-profit penetration, though tests of
markets with greater than or equal to 10% for-profit admissions on a more
limited data set yielded similar results. 163 Measured by the share of hospital
admissions in an MSA, the mean for-profit share market share was 0.115, the
median was 0.045, and the standard deviation was 0.149.
The market regressions support the theory that hospitals, particularly for-
profit and nonprofit hospitals, learn from or compete with neighboring
hospitals. The results also support, albeit with limited evidence, the idea that all
hospital types copy the profit-making techniques of their for-profit neighbors.
Again, I focused on three representative services to determine whether hospital
types offered different services in for-profit and other markets.
All hospital types were more likely to offer open-heart surgery, a very
profitable service, in markets with at least 20% for-profit market share than in
other markets (Figures 7).164 Nonprofit hospitals, for example, were on average
5.4 percentage points more likely to offer open-heart surgery in markets with at
least 20% for-profit penetration than in other markets (differences significant at
0.05% level; see Table 8 for hypothesis tests). For-profit and government
hospitals followed a similar pattern, offering open-heart surgery at a greater
rate in for-profit markets than in other markets (see Figure 7). Although the
results for for-profit hospitals were not statistically significant for the entire
study period, excluding the most recent two years of data (1999 and 2000),
162 Hansmann, supra note 84, at 866-68. In previous work, Cutler and I advanced the
hypothesis (coined the "inverse-Hansmann problem") that for-profit hospitals often move first in
markets and that nonprofit and government hospitals copy the behavior of for-profit hospitals. Cutler &
Horwitz, supra note 3, at 45-79.
163 Some readers might immediately worry that for-profit hospital penetration is endogenous
to service offerings. I address this question in depth in Part V, infra. A more detailed study regarding
ownership spillover effects is forthcoming. Horwitz & Nichols, supra note 8.
164 Regression results available from author.
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there were large and significant differences. At least for this profitable service,
having for-profit neighbors matters.
The home health results were similar to the open-heart surgery results for
nonprofit hospitals, which were more likely to offer home health in for-profit
markets than in other markets during almost the entire period (see Figure 8).
These results, coupled with those relating to open-heart surgery, might seem to
suggest that nonprofits are more likely to offer all services in for-profit markets
than in other markets. However, there is reason to reject this theory. First,
although nonprofits were more likely to offer home health in for-profit markets
throughout the study period, the largest gap between nonprofits in the different
market types occurred during the particularly profitable period for investment
from 1993 through 1996. Further, it was only during this profitable period that
for-profit hospitals were more likely to provide home health in for-profit
markets than in other markets (see Table 8). There was no statistically
significant difference between provision of home health care by government
hospitals in for-profit and other markets during this period.
On average, over the thirteen years studied, for-profit hospitals were
equally likely to offer psychiatric emergency services in both types of markets
(see Figure 9 and Table 8). However, government hospitals were 4.6
percentage points more likely to provide psychiatric emergency care in for-
profit markets than in others, although the difference was not statistically
significant. Nonprofit hospitals were also 4.5 percentage points more likely to
offer this unprofitable service in for-profit markets, and the results were
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
Interestingly, during the later years of the study period, nonprofits in for-
profit markets seemed to be exiting the psychiatric emergency business.
Although from 1988 to 1993 there was little difference in the probability of
offering the service in each type of market, from 1994 to 2000, nonprofits were
approximately 7.1 percentage points less likely to have the service in for-profit
markets than in other markets. The null hypothesis that the probabilities were
equal was rejected at the 0.05% level.
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Figure 7: Open-Heart Surgery, Market Penetration
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Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, nonrural hospitals in MSAs >1
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: not significant).
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hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: p<0.01).
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hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: p<0.05 ).
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Figure 8: Home Health, Market Penetration
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Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: p<0.05).
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Notes: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, nonrural hospitals in MSAs >1
hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: not significant).
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hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: p<0.01 (1994-1997)).
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Figure 9: Psychiatric Emergency, Market Penetration
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hospital. P-values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted
probabilities of offering services 1988-2000 by hospital type. (FP v. other: p <0.10).
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These results, coupled with those for open-heart surgery, support the
claim that hospitals are influenced by the profit-seeking behavior of their
neighbors. Nonprofits are more likely to offer profitable services and less likely
to offer unprofitable services in markets with relatively higher for-profit
penetration. For-profits and government hospitals also seem to be influenced by
their neighbor's ownership status, but to a somewhat lesser degree.
Some readers might find these results puzzling. When one firm increases
its output or offers a product, its competitors might be expected to decrease
their output or avoid producing the product at all.1 65 Here I am arguing that
precisely the opposite is likely happening. A hospital chooses its portfolio of
services in part by copying the choices of its neighbor.' 66 For example, if a
nonprofit hospital has a for-profit neighbor-that is, a neighbor that is more
likely to offer profitable services than it would-it too will offer those services.
Why might this be?
Even in markets that we think of as ordinary competitive markets, there
are incentives, not only to differentiate-to offer different products or alter
products so that they are not good substitutes for products offered by
competitors-but also to imitate.' 67 Think about markets for hotel services.
Differentiation occurs when individual hotels try to occupy different niches
based on quality, location, or room amenities. But there is a lot of copying as
well. The contents of honor bars in hotel room refrigerators look awfully
similar; what used to be a luxury, hairdryers or irons in rooms, for example, has
become standard equipment in many hotels. What I have shown here is that
firms in hospital services markets, as in other markets, exhibit a tendency to
imitate each other.
There are several reasons that are specific to hospital services markets for
why hospitals might not choose to differentiate but instead copy each other.
First, hospital care is not perfectly competitive. Hospitals are typically
oligopolies. Experimental evidence shows that oligopolistic competitors may
save effort by mimicking the choices of the successful firm in the market.168
They may also be able to offer the same services as their neighbors in a
165 1 thank Omri Ben-Shahar for this observation.
166 Another explanation is that some third factor influences all hospitals in given markets to
offer profitable services. Reasons for rejecting the most plausible factors are discussed in Part V, infra.
167 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 2; Jonathan Levin, Supermodular Games (Oct., 2003)
(unpublished research note, on file with the University of Michigan), available at
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/-soniv/research.d/SupermodularGames.pdf (describing supermodular games
as those where "when one player takes a higher action, the others want to do the same").
Supermodularity, characterized by strategic complementarities, is required for the outcome observed
here. Jovanic Boyan & Glenn M. Macdonald, Competitive Diffusion, 102 J. POL. ECON. 24 (1994)
(describing the spread of technology in competitive industries through innovating and imitation of
rivals' technology).
168 Theo Offerman, Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment, 69 REV.
ECON. STUD. 973 (2002).
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different part of the geographic market or patient population. Second, prices are
not set at the local level the way that prices for shoes or ice cream are set.
National price-setters-sometimes the government, sometimes an employer, or
sometimes a large insurer-determine the price. Therefore, local competition
would not squeeze out services the way it does for more conventional market
goods. Third, hospitals might learn from each other. When one hospital adopts
a new service another might think it is a good idea to adopt that service because
it improves the quality of the hospital. Although this learning may also occur in
standard retail markets (think about cell-phone plans or fashion trends), high-
tech markets like health care are more volatile so there is more opportunity for
changing product lines. Fourth, consumers (patients, doctors, insurers, and
employers) might draw inferences of true quality from service offerings. So
although consumers might not care that a particular service is being offered,
they will infer from its provision that the hospital is a high-quality institution.
Finally, hospitals and their staff may induce demand for new services. They
could buy a new machine, for example, and change the standard of care to
require that physicians use that machine on patients.
V. Alternative Explanations and Sensitivity Tests
A. Alternative Explanations
There are two important alternative explanations for the results, both
raising potential endogeneity concerns with the model. First, one might think
that firm types may pick where to operate based on the nature of the demand,
such as patient demand or physician practice preferences, in those areas.
Therefore, for-profits may not be offering services because of profitability but
because they locate where demand for profitable services is greatest. There is
some evidence for this explanation. As Wennberg and others have observed,
medical service provision varies considerably by small geographic region.
69
Norton and Staiger have further shown that the relatively low level of provision
of uncompensated care by for-profit hospitals can be explained, in part, by
location.17 0 Further, using a case study approach for three markets, McClellan
and Staiger suggested that for-profit hospitals locate in areas with overall low
hospital quality.' 
71
I tested this alternative explanation for the results by comparing different
hospital types operating within the same market using a fixed-effects approach.
I included an indicator variable for the year 2000 Hospital Referral Regions
(HRRs) in which each hospital operated. HRRs are regional health care
169 John E. Wennberg, Understanding Geographic Variations in Health Care Delivery, 340
NEW ENG. J. MED. 52 (1999).
170 Norton & Staiger, supra note 99.
171 McClellan & Staiger, supra note 99.
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markets, defined by the collection of zip codes in which residents who receive
most of their health care from hospitals in the region live. 172 The coefficient
implications produced by additional analyses of the three representative
services described above (open-heart surgery, psychiatric emergency care, and
home health care) remained the same. The relevant differences remained
significant at the 1% level with one exception: The joint difference between
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals offering open-heart surgery was not
significant.'
73
These results are not only quantitatively reassuring but they also make
sense. First, medical services differ in important ways from uncompensated
care, the good studied by Norton and Staiger. 174 Although their finding that
location explains differences in for-profit and nonprofit hospital charity care
provision makes sense-in fact, the early wave of hospital purchases by for-
profit chains were in relatively wealthy suburban areas, where there were
comparatively few uninsured patients-the finding does not necessarily mean
that differences in the provision of medical services can also be explained by
location. Indeed, there are reasons to believe this is not the case. It is probably
easier for hospitals to avoid locations that have high demand for
uncompensated care than to avoid locations that have high demand for a bundle
of unprofitable medical services. This is because insured patients demand both
profitable services and unprofitable services. To predict the demand for a large
number of services, potential hospital purchasers would need to know details
about patient population risk and insurance characteristics that are hard to find
and, moreover, change over time. An easier strategy for a hospital wishing to
earn profits would be to limit offerings of unprofitable services.
Second, based on how hospital conversion markets work, the objectives
explanation is more plausible than that of geographic selection. For-profit
chains have typically bought hospitals that were for sale, often because they
172 The Dartmouth Atlas website explains that:
Hospital Service Areas (HSAs) are local health care markets for hospital care. An HSA is a
collection of ZIP codes whose residents receive most of their hospitalizations from the
hospitals in that area. HSAs were defined by assigning ZIP codes to the hospital area where
the greatest proportion of their Medicare residents were hospitalized. Minor adjustments were
made to ensure geographic contiguity. Most hospital service areas contain only one hospital.
The process resulted in 3,436 HSAs, ranging in total 1996 population from 604 to 3,067,356.
Hospital referral regions (HRRs) represent regional health care markets for tertiary medical
care. Each HRR contained at least one hospital that performed major cardiovascular
procedures and neurosurgery. In a similar fashion, HRRs were defined by assigning HSAs to
the region where the greatest proportion of major cardiovascular procedures were performed,
with minor modifications to achieve geographic contiguity, a minimum population size of
120,000, and a high localization index. The process resulted in 306 hospital referral regions
which ranged in total 1996 population from 126,329 to 9,288,694.
Dartmouth Atlas, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2005).
173 For an explanation of significance tests, see supra note 155.
174 Norton & Staiger, supra note 99.
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were failing financially. 175 Hospitals fail for many reasons, including poor
management, that are not related to geography.
An alternative explanation, which is not addressed by this study, is that
individual hospitals choose ownership form based on their financial status.
According to this theory, profitable hospitals choose for-profit status, and
unprofitable hospitals choose nonprofit status. This explanation, however, is at
odds with conversion experience. Failing hospitals, not profitable hospitals,
typically convert from nonprofit to for-profit status. 176 In addition, hospital
reimbursement and financial margins are uncertain and fluctuate considerably
over relatively short time periods. 177 Even if hospitals could reasonably predict
reimbursement rates and profitability, changes in ownership are costly in
several respects. Legal permissions are difficult to secure and challenges are
likely, professional legal and consulting costs are high, and reputation effects
can be large. Therefore, it is unlikely that ownership selection explains the
results.
Finally, the study's validity requires that legal constraints that are
unrelated to ownership must apply to all hospital types equally.' 78 A major
regulatory constraint on medical service provision is posed by certificate-of-
need programs-permissions required to operate certain types of capital-
intensive services. These certificate programs exist in only some states and for
only some services but they apply to all hospital types. It is possible that these
regulations have a stronger effect on for-profit hospitals because those
hospitals tend to be younger than nonprofits, perhaps because of regulatory
incentives such as those found in the Hill-Burton Act for hospitals to
incorporate as nonprofits.' 79 Therefore, it may be that the state is unwilling to
grant permission to latecomers to operate profitable and expensive service lines
if the state already has sufficient provision of those services. If true, however,
the results presented here for such services as open-heart surgery, which
requires certificate-of-need permission, are understated. The fixed effects
models described above, which compare hospital types operating in the same
small geographic region, should address a related concern that the results are
picking up a state regulatory effect rather than an ownership effect.'
80
175 Picone, supra note 4, at 58.
176 Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 3.
177 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADvISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 69 (2004).
178 I thank my colleague Nina Mendelson for pointing this out.
179 A summary of the Hill-Burton Act can be found in Evan M. Melhado, Health Planning in
the United States and the Decline of Public Interest Policymaking, 84 MILBANK Q. 359, 366-67 (2006).
180 Gresenz et al., supra note 156.
Vol. 24:1, 2007
Nonprofit Ownership
B. Sensitivity Tests
In addition to testing whether location, rather than hospital goals,
explained the results, I conducted several other sensitivity tests on the three
representative services discussed above (open-heart surgery, psychiatric
emergency, home health). The results were robust in almost all cases. For
example, although I controlled for the age of residents living near each hospital,
it could be that the functional form used in the basic specification did not
capture adequately the distribution of the elderly,' who are particularly high
users of hospital care. For example, it is reasonable to believe that the
relationship between the age of residents in a hospital's market and the services
that hospital provides is not the same for every age grouping. Therefore, to test
the sensitivity of the results to these demographic characteristics, I added age-
squared categories for percentages of the population over 65 years and over 80
years.
Further, because state payment policies for mental health services vary
considerably and, therefore, the results for psychiatric emergency care might be
better explained by state policy rather than by individual hospital objectives, I
compared different types of hospitals within each state. I did this by including
indicator variables for each state and state-year interactions for the psychiatric
emergency service estimations. In addition, because ownership types tend to
cluster in different regions, I altered the region variable to account for areas of
high for-profit penetration (e.g. South181 and Southwest 182) and included
dummy variables for all nine regions listed in the AHA dataset.
In addition, to test variation within the government hospital category-
that is, to see whether local government-owned hospitals differed from federal
hospitals-I excluded veterans' hospitals from the dataset. The probability that
nonprofit and non-veteran government hospitals were equally likely to offer
psychiatric emergency services could not be rejected at the 0.10 level.
The most important tests were related to hospital size. Because size is the
best predictor of offering any service, I restricted the regressions. to the
observations in the top two quartiles, bottom two quartiles, and middle two
quartiles of hospitals measured by number of admissions to the hospital.
Although the results remained significant in all other tests, when restricting the
tests to the smallest hospitals (those in the bottom two admissions quartiles),
the finding that nonprofit hospitals were more likely than government hospitals
to offer open-heart surgery was not significant. This result is not surprising
because so few small hospitals offer open-heart surgery at all. Among the
smallest hospitals but not all others, the finding that nonprofit hospitals were
181 Southern region includes: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
182 Southwestern region includes: Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Texas.
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more likely than for-profit hospitals to offer psychiatric emergency services
was not significant.
I also reanalyzed the three services using propensity scores, a method used
to make causal inferences when assignment to a group, such as corporate
ownership, is not random. 183 This method allowed me to ensure that I had
compared hospitals that differed primarily by ownership and not other
characteristics such as hospital size. More specifically, I determined the
conditional probability of corporate ownership (nonprofit v. for-profit;
nonprofit v. government, government v. for-profit) given the observed
characteristics used in the Probit estimates (the propensity scores), created five
subcategories defined by the estimated propensity score, and predicted the
probability of a hospital type offering a service in a given year controlling for
the propensity grouping. These tests did not change the results reported above
in any meaningful way.' 84 For example, the null hypothesis that nonprofit and
government hospitals were equally likely to offer open-heart surgery could not
be rejected at the 0.05 level (p=0.078).
VI. Insights, Implications, and Conclusions
These findings-that different hospital types systematically offer different
services according to their profitability-counter the claim that nonprofits and
for-profits are alike in all important ways. 185 The size and strength of the
findings are striking in themselves, particularly given the bluntness of the
dependent variables (in the form of a simple dichotomous variable measuring
whether a service is offered), the similar context of health regulation for all
types of hospitals, and the weak nature of nonprofit law and its enforcement.
A. Theoretical Insights
Although they may not be conclusive-as others have noted, ownership
theories have not tended to generate easily testable predictions-these findings
have consequences for theory. 186 First, any ownership theory must account for
the unique hybrid nature of nonprofits. Scholarship has tended to ignore the
differences among all three types. There is, for example, considerable research
on privatization that tends to be only about the public/private distinction. John
183 See Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in
Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983); Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B.
Rubin, Reducing Bias in Observational Studies Using Subclassification on the Propensity Score, 79 J.
AM. STAT. ASS'N 516 (1984).
184 The predicted probabilities of offering a service were slightly different than those
produced by the Probit tests because the predictions were generated only from subsets of the data (e.g.,
only nonprofits and for-profits; only public and nonprofits). The relationships among the hospitals,
however, were consistent with the Probit results.
185 Sloan, supra note 4.
186 Shen et al., supra note 94.
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Donahue, for example, outlines the choice between public and private as
having only two dimensions, financing and performance, with the latter
involving a choice between public and private sector delivery.' 87 Research on
nonprofits tends mainly to consider the profit-distributing/nondistributing
distinction. 188
But neither the divide between (1) public v. private (both for-profit and
nonprofit) institutions nor (2) profit-distributing v. nondistributing (both
nonprofit and government) institutions can explain all the differences described
here. Although nonprofits are similar to for-profits because they are both
private entities, they differ in their responsiveness to economic incentives. And,
although nonprofits are similar to government institutions because they are
legally prohibited from distributing profits to owners, nonprofits are not
substitutes for the government. This research teaches that, at least in the
hospital sector, one-size-fits-all regulation may not work. A single regulation
will induce different responses depending on whether the target is for-profit,
nonprofit, or government-owned.
Using this observation, policymakers can both fine tune incentive-based
regulation and protect against some of its hazards. A benefit of economic
incentive-based regulatory instruments over command-and-control regulation is
the flexibility and efficiency with which regulated parties can respond to
them.189 The federal Medicare financing system, for example, relies on a
complicated incentive-based reimbursement system to motivate providers to
work toward public ends. It uses capitated payments, risk-adjusted rates, and
other economic incentives that encourage hospitals to provide medically
appropriate and cost-efficient care. But there are downsides to using incentive-
based regulations. Agency costs, conflicting interests within organizations, and
shifting contexts may influence how those regulations work in practice.
190
Regulated organizations often have too much leeway to act in their self-interest,
which may undermine their furtherance of public goals. In fact, to combat the
risks of using economic incentives for profit-seeking health care providers-
particularly the selection of healthy patients and skimping on the quantity or
quality of care-policymakers work hard to formulate additional incentives and
regulations.
Yet even the most carefully designed systems cannot always sufficiently
channel the self-interest of profit-seeking institutions toward public ends.
Regulators cannot always accurately predict the responses of regulated
187 See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); see also Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1338 (2003) (noting that
she does not distinguish between private firm types).
188 An enormous volume of research follows Hansmann's definition of nonprofits as those
organizations subject to a nondistribution constraint. Hansmann, supra note 84, at 838.
189 Robert Howse, Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the
Future of the Regulatory State, 31 ALBERTA L. REV. 455, 459 (1993).
190 Id.
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institutions to carefully designed incentive systems. And sometimes they do not
even know exactly how they wish regulated institutions to behave, making both
traditional rule-based regulation and incentive-based systems inadequate tools.
Health care markets provide a good example. It is difficult for government
purchasers (e.g. the Medicare and Medicaid programs) to specify the quantity
and quality of the goods they want to buy, perhaps because regulators do not
know the appropriate quantity or cannot define the quality. Further, given the
complexity of health care markets, where insurers, providers, and consumers
(i.e., patients) are different entities and have different interests, it is very
difficult for purchasers to monitor the supply of health care (i.e., its quality,
quantity, and distribution).
Under such conditions, economists recommend containing these risks by
using low-powered incentives, those that are predicted to generate weak
responses among the targets of regulation. 191 Otherwise the regulated
organization might react in an undesirable way. To increase or decrease
financial incentives for health care production, regulators usually adjust
reimbursement rates or contracting terms to give providers more or less
decision-making flexibility.
This study suggests that ownership offers another mechanism through
which regulators can alter the strength of response to a given financial
incentive. That is, rather than alter the incentive itself to dampen an
organizational response, one could simply target different types of
organizations to vary the intensity of response to a given incentive. Or
regulators could vary financial incentives by form, setting rates by firm type or
selectively contracting with different firm types.
Second, the results do not support simple versions of capital price
theories. This study did not produce any clear pattern suggesting that capital
prices (either relative access to capital or varying costs of capital) constrain for-
profit, nonprofit, and governmental hospitals differently. The relationship of
capital prices, medical service production, and ownership needs more study.
With increasing hospital consolidation and the growth of hospital chains,
nonprofit hospitals may operate internal capital markets that make them more
similar to for-profit capital markets than the theories tested here suggest.
Likewise the theories explained above may overestimate the greater flexibility
of equity capital compared to tax-exempt debt; in addition, for-profits may
issue certain forms of tax-exempt debt, and nonprofits have access to flexible
funds such as an endowment.
92
These findings still make a contribution toward evaluating the various
explanations for hospital behavior. Objectives theories seem more plausible
than capital price theories, suggesting that simple differences in capital prices
191 Joseph P. Newhouse, Medicare Policy in the 1990s (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8531, 2001).
192 See Frank & Salkever, supra note 89; Frank & Salkever, supra note 112.
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do not hold the key to organizational differences. One would not turn a for-
profit hospital into a nonprofit by expanding access to tax-exempt debt, and one
would not turn a nonprofit hospital into a for-profit by allowing access to
equity markets.
Third, although specifying nonfinancial institutional goals is difficult, the
evidence bolsters the theory that government hospitals are hospitals of last
resort. They are more likely than other types of hospitals to offer unprofitable
services that are generally needed by poor, underinsured patients.' 9 3 Nonprofit
hospitals are an intermediate type. They are less responsive to financial
incentives than for-profit and more so than government hospitals, both in
offering profitable and avoiding unprofitable services. They are also less likely
than government hospitals to offer unprofitable, undersupplied services.
Fourth, the results shed light on the content of the nonprofit's goals. All
hospitals must care about profit-making. After all, not only for-profit but
nonprofit and government hospitals need to survive. Yet profit-making is likely
lower on the list of objectives for nonprofit than for-profit hospitals.
Controlling parties-be they managers, directors, doctors, or consumers-are
making different choices that vary systematically by ownership. This evidence
suggests that, at least in their extreme forms, capture models in which doctors
or administrators simply take the role of shareholders to pocket profits are
unlikely to be correct.194 If doctors, who run hospital medical boards, or
powerful nonprofit hospital administrators were effectively maximizing their
incomes, nonprofit hospitals might not offer unprofitable services at all.
Perhaps hospital boards of directors or community scrutiny constrains
employee capture, but the evidence presented here is also consistent with the
influence of employee altruism.
A fifth insight is that, despite notoriously weak enforcement mechanisms
of nonprofits, these results are consistent with the intent of laws that require
nonprofits to act in the public interest. 195 Despite widespread beliefs to the
contrary, nonprofit hospitals are not required to offer undersupplied services,
which tend to be unprofitable, but they choose to do so. Except for the very few
jurisdictions in which attorneys general held and exercised their oversight
powers during the study period, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals had the same
opportunities to open and close units, and they faced similar public relations
problems in doing so.
The results raise two further questions worthy of further attention. First,
why do for-profits offer any unprofitable services at all? Businesses trying to
maximize profits should not offer unprofitable product lines. However, for-
profit hospitals are subject to a series of constraints having to do with the goods
193 See Horwitz, supra note 124 (providing justification of profit categories and evidence that
unprofitable services are disproportionately needed by underinsured and uninsured patients).
194 See, e.g., Pauly & Redisch, supra note 106.
195 Why We Need, supra note 5.
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they provide-health services. These institutions are highly regulated and are
unable to drop certain services, such as emergency care, without incurring
extremely high costs. In addition, there are important, perhaps life-saving
complementarities among health services. Institutions that provide surgical
services, for example, need expensive, and often unprofitable, emergency
support systems. In fact, opponents of single-service specialty hospitals (such
as freestanding cardiac centers) argue that specialty hospitals with limited
emergency facilities jeopardize patient safety.' 9 6 Also, offering some services
that tend to be unprofitable such as obstetrical care is necessary to signal to
doctors, patients, and insurers that the hospital is a full-service institution.
Finally, some services are loss-leaders. Unprofitable obstetric care, for
example, attracts female patients who bring their families' profitable business
to the hospital.
Second, why do nonprofit hospitals choose not to offer all the profitable
services as well as some unprofitable services? Nonprofits must value profits to
some degree, even if less than for-profit hospitals, and they could use the
proceeds to cross-subsidize whatever other services they would like to offer.
One plausible answer is that nonprofit hospitals do not offer all the profitable
services because, following Newhouse's model, they differentially value
quality.' 97 The evidence presented here is consistent with the quality
explanation, although it does not prove it. It is unlikely that the most profitable
mix of services at any given time is the most medically appropriate mix. Public
payment rates are set through a complex and changing process based on,
among other factors, evolving judgment or reactions to past errors of rate-
setters, imperfect adjustments for demographic and geographic characteristics
of hospital markets, and the political strength of interested parties. Private
payment rates are also determined by complex negotiations and relative
bargaining power. This messy process does not inspire faith that regulators
have found the right price in terms of medical quality. For these reasons, the
rapid and large for-profit responses to changes in post-acute care profitability
raise doubts that those changes were initiated for quality reasons. It is not clear
that nonprofits and government hospitals have gotten it right either, but their
responses were far less dramatic. We need more study on how and, indeed,
whether these processes produce incentives for hospitals to provide a medically
appropriate service mix.
The preliminary results on market mix also suggest there are spillover
effects. Nonprofits and for-profits are both more likely to offer a profitable
service and less likely to offer an unprofitable service in for-profit markets than
in other markets. Government hospitals, however, appear to be relatively
unresponsive to the influence of their neighbors' ownership; although they
were more likely to offer a profitable service in for-profit markets than other
196 See Devers et al., supra note 132.
197 Newhouse, supra note 93.
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markets, the results did not extend to unprofitable or variably profitable
services. The sensitivity tests related to geography, particularly the HRR fixed
effects tests, suggest that there is a neighboring hospital effect, rather than a
market demand effect. 19  And, given the breadth of services tested, an
alternative theory based on market demand heterogeneity would require the
unlikely scenario that an entering hospital would gather information on and
make choices about complex bundles of goods. With only these results,
however, it is difficult to differentiate among such causal explanations as
isomorphism, local culture, competition, or market segmentation.
B. Implications for Law and Policy
These results have notable implications for tax, nonprofit, and health
law.' 9 9 First, economic theory supports the provision of tax subsidies for
nonprofit organizations on efficiency grounds if the subsidies solve market
200failures or lead to positive externalities. The findings presented here suggest
that nonprofits may do both. The study does not demonstrate, however, that it is
the tax subsidy rather than some other aspect of nonprofit status that causes the
identified differences. This lack of causal evidence has led some scholars to
recommend removal of tax exemption or conditioning it on the provision of
specific public goods.201 I think removing the exemption would be shortsighted
because of potential unintended consequences to both insured and indigent
patients alike. And given the poor enforcement of other nonprofit laws such as
state fiduciary duties, it is a reasonable guess that the tax regime is driving the
results presented here. More study is needed to determine the separate effects
of ownership status and its associated benefits.
Still, the results from this research are consistent with the idea that
nonprofits prioritize some desirable goals, such as providing the right mix of
medical services, over profit-maximization. Individual patients, their doctors,
and their insurance companies alone cannot contract for the right mix of
medical services because of the host of well-known agency problems
associated with medical care provision, so they must rely on hospitals to be
trustworthy decision makers on their behalf.
Also, although not conclusive, the findings are consistent with the idea
that nonprofits are more likely than for-profits to think about quality over
profits. For example, it is simply implausible that the dramatic entry into and
exit out of home health care by for-profit hospitals was based on medical
judgment. Medical knowledge and market demographics just do not change
198 A thorough study of the spillover effects of ownership form on medical service provision
is underway. Horwitz & Nichols, supra note 8.
199 For a discussion of some of these implications, see Why We Need, supra note 5.
200 William M. Gentry & John R. Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-for-profit Hospitals, in
CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 3, at 285.
201 Bloche, supra note 41.
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that quickly. Neither is there any reason to think that government price-setters
made dramatic changes in reimbursement to inspire hospitals to enter and exit
for medical reasons-they simply failed to predict the ability of hospitals to
"game" the Medicare system and adjusted prices to reflect their failure. If this
example is generalizable, and the evidence suggests that it may be, nonprofit
hospitals are more likely than for-profits to be providing the mix of services
that patients would demand if they could.
What is particularly noteworthy in these results is the type of goods
supplied by nonprofits. Scholars typically look at nonprofits to determine
whether they provide public goods in the economic sense (goods that are
nonrival and nonexcludable) or relatively unprofitable care for the poor (which
may or may not be a public good in the economic sense). And there is some
evidence here that nonprofits provide both. Yet, nonprofits may provide private
goods that are nonetheless in the public interest and are less likely to be
provided by for-profit hospitals. For example, nonprofits may increase the
availability of medically appropriate services for insured patients that would
otherwise be unavailable altogether. To the extent that well-insured or wealthy
patients want these unprofitable services, they may not be able to buy them
because of distortions caused by regulations forcing hospitals to take all
comers.
Elsewhere, I have used the example of a trauma center to illustrate this
point.202 Under normal market conditions, a for-profit hospital would likely not
meet the demand for trauma care, because hospitals must treat indigent patients
along with paying patients and trauma centers can be big money losers. The
results here are consistent with the conclusion that nonprofits and government
hospitals can address this allocative inefficiency because they decide which
203
services to provide on grounds other than profit maximization.
Of course, for-profit hospitals may choose to provide these goods for
many reasons: to be perceived as a "full-service" hospital, to attract doctors by
offering the full range of services, or to generate good will. The significance of
my argument here is not that nonprofits necessarily get the mix of services
right, but that they are not as responsive to economic incentives, many of which
we subsequently understand to be imprecise. Nonprofits may be doing
something desirable instead of maximizing profits.
These arguments lead to the more concrete recommendation that in
measuring community benefit and determining whether nonprofits justify their
tax exemptions, policymakers should consider whether and how nonprofit
institutions provide many types of goods. If they concern themselves solely
202 Why We Need, supra note 5.
203 Although there are markets that do not have for-profits, it is unclear from these data
whether, in the absence of for-profit competitors, nonprofits would continue to provide these benefits.
Given the current and persistent distribution of hospital types, the results are still useful. I am conducting
further study to answer this question. Horwitz & Nichols, supra note 8. 1 thank my colleague, Omri Ben-
Shahar for this observation.
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with the provision of free care for indigent patients, as many have, or even
other conventional public goods, they likely understate the public benefits
differentially provided by nonprofit hospitals. And they may do so with grave
consequences to insured patients as well as the uninsured patients who are
usually discussed in debates about nonprofit hospital tax-exemption. Further, to
the extent that there are spillover effects from nonprofit to for-profit hospitals,
as the data suggest there may well be, there are also externalities that have not
been accounted for in policy discussions regarding reforming nonprofit law.
Finally, eliminating nonprofit subsidies might encourage nonprofit
hospitals to convert to for-profit form, which would result in several lost
regulatory opportunities. Although state attorneys general and federal and state
tax authorities have not traditionally paid significant attention to enforcing
existing charities law, they could. Almost all state attorneys general have the
legal power, if not the budgets, to do So.204
Nonprofit hospitals have increasingly found themselves targets of
considerable criticism. Indeed, some make attractive targets. Characterized at
their worst, they are simply for-profits in disguise. Although the average
nonprofit hospital operates at a negative margin, 20 5 some earn profits,
sometimes significant profits. The fund balances of profitable hospitals can be
very large and seductive to cash-strapped governments. (Of course, the money
is, in fact, in nonprofit bank accounts and not doled out to shareholders or as
employee perquisites). Some nonprofit hospitals turn away patients and try to
collect on their bills, even when the patients cannot afford to pay them. They do
not provide much more charity care than their for-profit competitors. (Of
course, they might soon go broke if they provided as much as some observers
want; it is unrealistic to think that nonprofit hospitals can solve our national
health care crisis, and recent constraints on debt collection by hospitals are
206
unlikely to help patients out of their financial difficulty). I am quite sure if
you asked the average inpatient or the average citizen to identify the corporate
ownership of the hospital in which she received care, she would have no idea
whether it was nonprofit or for-profit. (Of course, inpatients and citizens are
busy thinking about other things). So there will not likely be widespread
support for the woes of nonprofit hospitals.
204 Jill R. Horwitz, State Oversight of Hospital Conversions: Preserving Trust or Protecting
Health? (Wiener Center for Social Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper No. H-98-
03, 1998) (surveying state attorneys general power to oversee charities).
205 Author's analysis; see David M. Cutler, Naomi E. Feldman, & Jill R. Horwitz, U.S.
Adoption of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1654, 1658 (2005)
(showing negative average net income per admission of nonprofit and government hospitals in one
study). Typical operating margins among all U.S. acute care hospitals are less than two percentage
points. Leemore Dafny & David Dranove, Regulatory Exploitation and the Market for Corporate
Control (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,438, 2006).
206 See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 57 (discussing the problems with the public perception
that hospitals have misbehaved in their billing practices rather than structural problems associated with
widespread medical-related financial distress).
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Limiting the tax exemption, or even removing it entirely, seems like an
easy way to raise revenues and, at the same time, avoid the much more difficult
problem of addressing the deep structural problems associated with health care
financing.207 It is not surprising that conditioning the exemption on the
provision of free care for indigent patients, as some states already do and some
members of Congress seem to favor, has many fans. But the reforms will not
begin to address the problems associated with the fact that over one-third of
American adults have insufficient insurance or none at all during a year.208
Furthermore, these changes should not be enacted for the reasons commonly
offered-that nonprofits are just like for-profits, particularly because of their
charity care offerings.
Nonprofits are different than for-profits. They offer different services,
meet different needs, and very likely operate out of motivations of which we
(and our liberal tax code) would approve. It could be that, after careful
consideration of all that is at stake, it makes sense to impose charity care
requirements on nonprofits or limit the exemptions. But doing so will come
with consequences, many of them quite unattractive. The evidence presented
here demonstrates what some of those consequences might be and, most
surprisingly, how they will affect all of us, even the well-insured.
207 See id. (same).
208 Cathy Schoen et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults Are Underinsured?,
HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-289 (2005).
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Appendix
Table 1: Comparison of Services Offered at Study Hospitals, 1988-2000
Service
AIDS (Outpatient)
AIDS Services
AIDS Unit
Alcohol Beds
Alcohol/ Drug (Outpatient)
Angioplasty
Birthing Room
Bum Treatment
Cardiac Catheterization
Lab
Computed Tomography
Scanner (CT Scanner)
Child Psychiatric Services
Diagnostic Radioisotope
Facility
Emergency Room
Extracorporeal Shock-
Wave Lithotripter
Fitness Center
HIV Test
Home Health
Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI)
Neonatal Intensive Care
Obstetrics (births)
Open Heart Surgery
Orthopedic Surgery
Pediatric Intensive Care
Unit
Positron Emission
Tomography
Psychiatric (inpatient)
Psychiatric Emergency
Services
Skilled Nursing
Single Photon Emission
Computed Tomography
Sports Medicine
Trauma Center
Ultrasound
Women's Center
Relatively Relatively Capital
Percent Profitable Unprofitable Variable Intensive
11%
54%
4%
30%
33%
40%
69%
5%
54%
X
X
X
X
X
92% X
6% X
Source: Percent of hospitals offering service is from author's analysis of American Hospital Association
Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. Assignments to profitability categories and capital incentive status based
on author's analysis available at Horwitz, supra note 124.
Note: Includes all non-rural, general medical, and surgical hospitals in MSAs with >1 hospital.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 24:1, 2007
Table 2: Summary of Independent Variables
Hospital Characteristic or Market Characteristic Percent
Nonprofit 65%
Government 17%
For-Profit 18%
Hospitals in Admission Quartile 1 25%
(mean total admissions per hospital in quartile = 1,950)
Hospitals in Admission Quartile 2 25%
(mean total admissions per hospital in quartile = 5,410)
Hospitals in Admission Quartile 3 25%
(mean total admissions per hospital in quartile = 9,930)
Hospitals in Admission Quartile 4 25%
(mean total admissions per hospital in quartile = 20,420)
Hospitals in MSA Size 1 2%
(population < 100,000)
Hospitals in MSA Size 2 14%
(100,000 < population < 250,000)
Hospitals in MSA Size 3 16%
(250,000 < population < 500,000)
Hospitals in MSA Size 4 16%
(500,000 < population < 1,000,000)
Hospitals in MSA Size 5 27%
(1,000,000 < population < 2,500,000)
Hospitals in MSA Size 6 25%
(population >2,500,000)
Teaching Hospital 13%
Hospitals in Northeast 21%
Hospitals in South 35%
Hospitals in Midwest 23%
Hospitals in West 21%
Mean % male in market 49%
Mean % white in market 79%
Mean % black in market 13%
Mean In (household income) in market * 10.35%
Mean % baby in market 1%
(< 1 year)
Mean % age 1 to 17 in market 24%
Mean % age 18 to 29 in market 19%
Mean % age 30 to 39 in market 17%
Mean % age 40 to 49 in market 9%
Mean % age 50 to 64 in market 13%
Mean % > age 65 in market 12%
Mean % > age 80 in market 3%
Mean % with elementary education in market 18%
Mean % with high school diploma in market 22%
Mean % with some college in market 20%
Mean % with college degree in market 15%
• approximately $31,250
Source: Author's analysis of full sample of data used in research. Data are from AHA Annual Survey,
1988-2000.
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Table 3: Model Predictions
Theory Predictions
Objectives Theories: For Profitable Services:
Hospital types offer F>N>G
different services because
they have different goals re: For Unprofitable Services:
profit-seeking. G>N>F
Capital Constraint Theories: For Services with high
Hospital types offer capital costs:
different services because F>N or N>F
they face different capital
prices.
For Profitable Services:
NF Markets > NOther Markets
Market Effects Theory: GF Markets > GOther Markets
Hospitals offer different FF Markets > FOther Markets
services based on their
competitors' ownership For Unprofitable Services:
status. NF Markets < NOther Markets
GF Markets < GOther Markets
FF Markets < FOther Markets
Note: F = for-profit; N = nonprofit; G = government. ">" means that a hospital is more likely to offer a
service and "<" means that a hospital is less likely to offer a service. F Markets are markets with >=
20% for-profit hospital penetration measured by admission share. Other Markets are markets with <
20% for-profit hospital penetration measured by admission share.
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Table 4: Relative Profitability Categories and Source Summary
Reimbursement!
Insurance
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Trade
&
Interviews/ Pop.
Surveys Press
x
x
Physician
Salaries
x x x
x x x
X/? X
x x
x x
x x x
x
Service
AIDS Services
Bum
Treatment
Emergency
Room
Cardiac Care
Angioplasty
Cardiac
Catheterizati-
on Lab
Open Heart
Surgery
Diagnostic
Imaging -
generally
Computed
Tomography
Scanner (CT
Scanner)
Diagnostic
Radioisotope
Facility
Magnetic
Resonance
Imaging
(MRI)
Positron
Emission
Tomography
Single Photon
Emission
Computed
Tomography
Ultrasound
Extracorporeal
Shock-Wave
Lithotripter
Fitness Center
Mental Health
& Substance
Abuse
Alcohol/ Drug
(Outpatient)
Alcohol/Drug
(Inpatient)
Child
Psychiatric
Services
Psychiatric
(inpatient)
Psychiatric
x
x x
U X
U X
U X x x
Category
U
U
Academic
Literature
x
x
U X
x x
x
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Emergency
Services
Neonatal and P X X/? X/?
Pediatric Care
Neonatal P X X X
Intensive
Care
Pediatric P X X X
Intensive
Care Unit
Obstetrics *U X X X X/?
Orthopedic P X X X
Surgery
Post-Acute V X X X
Care -
Overall
Home Health V X X X
Skilled V X X X
Nursing
Sports P X X
Medicine
Trauma Center U X X X/? X
Women's P X X X
Center
*Although obstetric care itself is unprofitable, many hospitals use it as a loss leader to attract female
patients who will direct their families to the hospitalfor other services.
Notes: U=relatively unprofitable, P=relatively profitable, V=variably profitable: unclear 1988-92,
profitable 1992-96, unprofitable 1997-2000. X/? = mixed evidence. Profitability assessment supported
by: Academic literature = by peer-reviewed literature; Government Reimbursement/Insurance Status =
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission reports or academic literature analyzing reimbursement policy
or status of patients likely to seek services; Interviews/ Surveys = author interviews or surveys of
hospital managers; Trade Literature/ Popular Press = articles categorizing profitability of service;
Physician Salaries = relatively high or low annual median physician specialty salaries from the MGMA
Physician Compensation and Production Survey 1991-2004. In addition to the sources cited above, all
service designations were reviewed by reimbursement experts, hospital executives, and physician
interviewees. A full report on service designations and literature review can be found elsewhere.
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Table 5: Comparison of Services Offered by Ownership Type, 1988-
2000
Profitable Services F>N F>G N>G
Angioplasty (1989-2000) Y*** Y*** Y***
Birthing Room@ N* N Y
Cardiac Catheterization Lab Y*** Y*** Y***
Computed Tomography Scanner (CT Scanner) N Y Y*
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility N* Y*** Y***
Extracorporeal Shock- Wave Lithotripter Y*** Y*** Y***
Fitness Center N** N Y**
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Y Y*** Y***
Neonatal Intensive Care@ (beds>) Y*** Y*** N***
Open Heart Surgery Y*** Y*** Y***
Orthopedic Surgery (1989-1993) N Y*** Y***
Pediatric Intensive Care@(beds>1) Y*** Y*** N***
Positron Emission Tomography (1990-2000) Y Y* Y
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography N** y Y***
(1990-2000)
Sports Medicine Y*** Y***
Ultrasound N*** N Y
Women's Center@ Y*** Y*** Y*
Unprofitable Services F>N F>G N>G
AIDS (Outpatient) (1988-1993) N N*** N***
AIDS Services (1994-2000) N*** N*** N***
AIDS Unit (1988-1993) Y** N N***
Alcohol/Drug Inpatient (Beds> 1) Y*** Y* N***
Alcohol/ Drug Outpatient N*** N*** N***
Burn Treatment (Beds > 0) Y N* N***
Child/Adolescent Psychiatric @ (Beds > 0) N N* N
Emergency Room N** Y Y***
Emergency Room@ N* = Y
HIV Test (1988-1991) N N* N*
Obstetrics (births >= 100) @ N*** N** N
Psychiatric Inpatient (1989 - 2000, beds> 1) Y** N*** N***
Psychiatric Emergency Services N*** N*** N***
Psychiatric Emergency Services@ N*** N*** N
Trauma Center N** N Y
Trauma Center@ N** N*** N***
High initial capital investment services in italics.
Note: Y = yes; N = no; "=" if difference between firms < .003. F = For-profit; N=Nonprofit,
G=Government. @ excludes veterans' hospital. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All results include data
from 1988-2000 unless noted.
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Table 6: Hypothesis Tests
Services, years Hypothesis Test Hypothesis Test
1988-2000 Means (Average All Years) (Joint All Years)
(unless
otherwise
noted) NP GOV FP FP/NP GOV/NP FP/GOV FP/NP GOV/NFP FP/GOV
ESWL 0.169 0.131 0.217 12.630 8.850 29.020 21.820 17.390 42.600
" 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.058 0.182 0.000
Home Health 0.468 0.459 0.330 63.100 0.160 34.800 226.550 21.130 205.570
0.000 0.688 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000
Home Health 0.421 0.391 0.205 89.740 1.720 47.880 96.040 6.600 59.670
(1988-1993) 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.000
Home Health 0.525 0.518 0.595 7.750 40.590 61.730 11.130 1.260 7.210
(1995- 1997) 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.738 0.065
Home Health 0.495 0.539 0.262 79.000 2.680 72.640 85.490 3.570 81.750
(1998 -2000) 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.000
MRI 0.484 0.409 0.507 1.710 20.440 24.240 22.510 35.980 38.910
0.191 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.001 0.000
Open Heart 0.336 0.279 0.409 20.630 11.090 38.190 29.300 30.460 54.910
Surgery 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.000
Psychiatric ER 0.475 0.559 0.408 12.310 20.190 41.610 16.960 34.790 47.790
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.001 0.000
Table 7: Comparison of Probability of Offering Services With Variable
Profits, by Ownership Type
More Profitable (1992-1996) Less Profitable (1997-2000)
For-profit Nonprofit Gov. For-profit Nonprofit Gov.
Home Health + 39.3 + 9.7 + 12.7 -37.6 - 7.7 - 1.5
Skilled Nursing + 28.1 + 15.4 +4.9 +2.8 +4.7 +9.7
Source: Author's analysis of data American Hospital Association Annual Surveys 1988-2000.
Notes: F = For-profit; N=Nonprofit, G=Government. Values are the percentage point change in
probability of offering service during the years indicated.
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Table 8: Hypothesis Test for Market Effects Tests
Service
Open Heart Surgery
NP Hospitals
Gov Hospitals
FP Hospitals
Psychiatric ER
NP Hospitals
88-93
94-00
Gov Hospitals
FP Hospitals
Home Health
NP Hospitals
Gov Hospitals
FP Hospitals
88-93
94-97
FP Market >= 20% Share
Other FP 20% Chi2/Pr>ChiA2
0.32
0.255
0.391
0.481
0.477
0.484
0.546
0.392
0.457
0.472
0.326
0.231
0.5
0.374
0.347
0.431
0.436
0.463
0.413
0.592
0.4
0.516
0.418
0.333
0.188
0.613
5.045
0.025
7.313
0.007
1.39
0.239
3.262
0.071
0.216
0.642
18.119
0.011
1.641
0.200
0.044
0.835
4.119
0.042
1.233
0.267
0.009
0.923
1.673
0.196
8.089
0.004
